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PARKING FACILITIES AS PUBLIC UTILITIES
David R. Levin*
T HERE ARE CITIES in the United States where neither private
enterprise nor public authority is making a significant effort
toward the provision of off-street parking facilities because of a
sharp difference of opinion as to which one should do the job.
This conflict between the public enterprisers and the private enter-
prisers has stymied action, to the detriment of the public interest
in a field of the most critical importance. This study of the possible
application of the public utility concept to off-street parking facil-
ities has been undertaken in an attempt to resolve this dilemma.'
The successful arbitrator must first determine the principal
objectives of each disputant. Proponents of municipal action seek
reasonable user rates, high standards of service, responsible
management, and permanent locations and capacity appropriately
related to the generators of parking demand. Advocates of the
private provision of parking facilities seek profits and freedom
* University of Wisconsin, B. A. (1934), M. A. (1936), LL. B. (1936), Ph. D.
(1937). Member, Wisconsin and federal bars. Chief, Land Studies Section, Finan-
cial and Administrative Research Branch, Bureau of Public Roads; Chairman,
Committee on Land Acquisition and Control of Highway Access and Adjacent Areas,
Highway Research Board; Member, Committee on Urban Traffic and Parking,
Section of Municipal Law, American Bar Association.
1 Public utilities may be municipally owned and operated. This monograph is
concerned only with public utilities that are owned and operated by private persons
or corporations. Statutes exist authorizing municipalities to acquire land for use
as off-street parking lots. See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24,
§ 52.1-1 et seq. The latter was held constitutional in Poole v. City of Kankakee,
406 Il. 521, 94 N. E. (2d) 416 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 188.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
from municipal competition. The public utility approach may
contain the essential elements of a compromise that would be
acceptable to both disputants, embodying the major objectives
of each.
The plan of this monograph, then, calls first for the isolation
of the legal elements of a public utility, insofar as they are dis-
cernible from the statutes and the court decisions, and, in that
regard, to delineate the nature of an enterprise "affected with
a public interest." Second, such matters as certificates of public
convenience and necessity, monopolistic characteristics, the ele-
ments of public use, and rate regulation will be explored. Third,
existing public regulation of commercial parking facilities will
be indicated. Lastly, an appraisal will then be made concerning
the qualification of off-street parking facilities as public utilities.
I. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF A PUBLIC UTILITY
Before a student of the problem can speculate as to whether
off-street parking facilities would legally qualify as a public utility,
he must be informed as to the characteristics which the judiciary
has, from time to time, attached to the public utility concept.
Sometimes, the courts have been evasive, perhaps purposefully.
Moreover, it is difficult to fashion a definition of a public utility
which would fit every conceivable case. So far as it is possible
to deduce them, the legal elements of a public utility would appear
to be about as follows: (1) The enterprise must be "affected with
a public interest." Property becomes clothed with a public interest
when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and when
it affects the community at large. 2 (2) The enterprise must involve
a "public use." The public utility concept is involved if private
property is devoted to such a use that the public generally, or
that part of the public which has been served and has accepted
the service, has the right to demand that the use or service shall
be conducted with reasonable efficiency and for proper charges.3
2 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
3 Garkane Power Co. v. Public Serv. Commission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P. (2d) 571,
132 A. L. R. 1490 (1940). See also 132 A. L. R. 1498, 93 A. L. R. 248, 18 A. L. R.
764, and L. R. A. 1918C 55.
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(3) The enterprise must involve "monopolistic characteristics."
To qualify from this point of view, the activity must enjoy in a
large measure an independence and freedom from business com-
petition facilitated either by its acquirement of a monopolistic
status or by the grant of a franchise or certificate from the state
placing it in this position. 4 (4) Finally, the enterprise must bear
an intimate connection with the processes of "transportation or
distribution. '5
The foregoing are the elements of a public utility which the
present Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court set
forth, in Davies Warehouse Company v. Brown,6 while acting as
Chief Judge of the Emergency Court of Appeals. Chief Justice
Vinson further indicated that the formula is
designed only to provide an absolute test or standard by
which one may affirmatively determine that a particular busi-
ness is a public utility. I do not wish to be misunderstood
as indicating that a business possessed of or operating under
less than the total of these features may not be considered
a public utility . . . any business which does possess and
practice and operate under each and all of these features, is
by a preponderance of considered judicial opinion a business
in the public utility class.
7
In short then, these are the most important elements that go to
make up this legal creature known as a public utility. They may
be summarized in the form of four key phrases: (a) affected with
a public interest; (b) involve a public use; (c) have monopolistic
characteristics; and (d) be related to transportation and distri-
bution. The array would not be complete, perhaps, without some
reference to certificates of convenience and necessity, a device
frequently used to regulate public utilities. Whether a given enter-
prise may be deemed to be a public utility, however, is a mixed
question of law, economics, and sociology.
4 Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, 137 F. (2d) 201 (1943).
5 Ibid.
6 137 F. (2d) 201 (1943).
7 137 F. (2d) 201 at 217.
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Before it is possible to test the off-street parking enterprise
in terms of these essential legal elements, it is necessary to know
something more about each of them in order that a judgment of
qualification or disqualification may be as precise as possible.
In that regard, it might be wise to indicate some of the types of
enterprises that have been held to be public utilities, for purpose
of comparison. Among such are (1) transportation facilities, of
the type of toll roads, canals, railroads, steamship lines, ferries,
pipelines, express companies, and motor carriers of freight and
passengers; (2) accommodations ancillary to transportation,
such as terminal facilities, including wharves and docks, bridges,
sleeping-cars, and baggage transfer equipment; (3) marketing
facilities, such as commodity exchanges, grain elevators, ware-
houses, stockyards, and market ticker services; (4) systems of
communication, including telegraph, telephone, radio communi-
cation and broadcasting; (5) local utilities, such as water supply,
irrigation, gas, electric power, heating, sewerage, street railways,
taxicabs, and others; (6) special facilities, traditionally regulated,
such as innkeepers, grist mills, sawmills, hawkers and peddlers,
pawnbrokers, and bakers; and (7), recently regulated enterprises,
such as slaughterhouses, cotton gins, insurance companies and
their agents, housing, banking, milk marketing, the processing
of farm products and butter substitutes, and coal mining.8 These
businesses should be kept generally in mind as the analysis
proceeds.
A. AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST
One of the essential characteristics of a public utility, in
years past, has been that the enterprise involved must be "affected
with a public interest." It was said, quite early in the public
utility regulation era, through the decision in Munn v. Illinois,9
that when
one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
8 Adapted from Barnes, The Economics of Public Utility Regulation, 1942, p. 20.
Perhaps as diversified as the foregoing enumeration is the list of enterprises con-
strued by the courts as not amounting to public utilities, to-wit: foundries, coal
yards, mills, restaurants, apartment houses, parcel checking facilities, theater-ticket
brokers, renting of automobiles, meat packing, ice manufacturing, and the sale of
gasoline.
994 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
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interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.10
Changing economic and social conditions may make a business
hitherto of little public concern of such importance to the welfare
of the community that regulation becomes inevitable. The absence
of regulation may force the direct performance of an increasing
number of economic functions by the state or by its political
agencies.
The courts, of course, are the final arbiters as to whether
or not a particular enterprise is affected with a public interest.
Many years ago, Chief Justice Taft declared that
the mere declaration by a legislature that a business is affected
with a public interest is not conclusive of the question whether
its attempted regulation on that ground is justified. The cir-
cumstances of its alleged change from the status of a private
business and its freedom from regulation into one in which
the public have come to have an interest are always a subject
of judicial inquiry.1
In light of the judicial principles already enunciated by the
courts, it should not be difficult to qualify off-street parking facili-
ties as being "affected with a public interest." The ownership
and use of the motor vehicle is widespread in the United States,
with approximately forty-eight million motor vehicles generating
over four hundred and fifty billion vehicle-miles of travel annually.
Approximately half of the motor vehicle travel takes place in
urban areas. Thousands of urban motorists daily seek to penetrate
the central business districts of each of the cities, and to park
therein. Yet the available parking space, both curb and off-street,
is far short of the actual demand, let alone the potential demand.
How critical this problem is becoming in many municipalities is
revealed by the data in the annexed table.
10 94 U. S. 113 at 126, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 84.
11 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630,
67 L. Ed. 1103, 27 A. L. R. 1280 (1923). See also Public Cleaners v. Florida Dry
Cleaning and Laundry Board, 32 F. Supp. 31 (1940).
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In the largest cities, five motorists contend for each parking space
available; four of them must seek accommodations elsewhere.
In certain cases, especially where -rate regulation was involved,
the United States Supreme Court appears to have abandoned the
concept of "affected with a public interest" in favor of a broader
principle. 13 The guaranty of due process, the court now asserts,
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary,
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have, a 'real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. A number
of state courts have followed this same line of reasoning.
14 It
should be noted, however, that only rate regulation was involved
in these cases, and that the other concomitants of public utility
control, such as certificates of convenience and necessity, were
not involved. It seems wise, therefore, to assume, in the case of
off-street parking facilities, that the doctrine of "affected with a
public interest" will continue to apply.
12 Reprinted from Hitchcock and Burrage, "Some Travel and Parking Habits
Observed from Parking Studies," Public Roads, June 1950.
13 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469
(1934) ; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 61 S. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305, 133 A. L. R.
1500 (1941).
14 State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P. (2d) 650 (1941) : Smith Bros.
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. People, 108 Colo. 449, 119 P. (2d) 623 (1941); Kelly-
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B. PARKING AS A PUBLIC USE
A legal characteristic of a public utility, closely related to
the concept of being "affected with a public interest," is the
doctrine of devotion to a public use, already referred to. Many
years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled that taxicabs
could be regulated as a public utility15 on the theory that the
taxicab company was "an agency for public use for the convey-
ance of persons," notwithstanding the fact that a single cab
conveys only one group of passengers in one vehicle. The particu-
lar cab company involved had also contracted with several hotels
to furnish taxicab service to hotel guests at specified times. Despite
these facts, the Supreme Court stated that it did not
perceive that this limitation removes the public character of
the service . . . No carrier serves all the public. His customers
are limited by place, requirements, ability to pay and other
facts. But the public generally is free to go to hotels it can
afford to, as it is free to travel by rail, and through the hotel
door to call on the plaintiff for a taxicab . . . The service
affects so considerable a fraction of the public that it is public
in the same sense in which any other may be called so. The
public does not mean everybody all the time.16
The close parallel between parking facilities and taxicabs
seems obvious. A commercial off-street parking facility is open
to any motorist who desires to park in its particular location and
pay the fee asked, as long as there is space available. Parking
facilities today probably serve a larger segment of the public than
did taxicabs thirty-five years ago when they were deemed to be
public utilities.
The enterprise which provided the greatest impetus, perhaps,
to the expansion of the public utility concept was the grain ele-
vator business. For years, the grain producing regions of the
West and Northwest had sent their grain by water and rail to
15 Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252, 36 S. Ct. 583, 60 L. Ed. 984 (1916).
16 241 U. S. 252 at 255, 36 S. Ct. 583, 60 L. Ed. 984 at 986.
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Chicago for reshipment to the East. The need for intermediate
terminals at Chicago created a demand for grain elevators where
immense quantities of grain could be stored and reshipped by rail
or water. Nine firms, owned by some thirty persons, controlled
all of the elevator and warehouse facilities in that city and set
uniform fees which the shippers labeled as exorbitant but which
they were compelled to pay because no other facilities were avail-
able. Pursuant to constitutional revision occurring in Illinois in
1870, legislation was enacted designating grain elevators as public
utilities, calling for the licensing of such facilities, and providing
for the regulation of rates. In a leading case, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the regulation on the grounds that the
grain elevators in question were "affected with a public interest"
and had been "devoted to a public use." The court was very much
aware of the strategic position of the elevators with reference to
grain movements, saying "they stand . . . in the very gateway of
commerce," and take a toll from all who pass.
17
Here again, a striking comparison can be made between grain
elevators and off-street parking facilities. Just as grain is shipped
to Chicago from many different parts of the West and Northwest,
so motor vehicles from many different parts of a metropolitan
area are driven into the heart of the city each day. These vehicles
must be parked somewhere for short periods of time, like grain
upon its arrival in Chicago. Just as grain must be stored while
awaiting reshipment, the motor vehicle must be parked while its
driver works or shops or performs some other errand. Just as
Ira Munn and George Scott, in the 1860's, "embarked their capital
and devoted their industry"' to supplying storage space for grain,
private individuals today supply commercial parking facilities for
motor vehicles. Just as the owners and operators of elevators
charged unreasonably high rates for grain storage, so may the
owners of private parking accommodations be in a position to
17 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 at 126, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 84 (1876).
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charge high rates for automobile storage, because of the great
disparity between the supply of and the demand for such facilities.
Aside from these analogies to enterprises already judicially
construed to be public utilities, off-street parking facilities have
already been held to involve a public use by a number of high
courts in the United States. In the recent case of McSorley v.
Fitzgerald,"' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a legisla-
tive declaration that the provision of off-street parking facilities
involved a public use. The language used by the court is typical
of the attitude of other jurisdictions on the matter. It said:
Not only is the declaration of legislative findings in the pres-
ent Act impressive in pointing out the urgent need of legis-
lation of this type, but the conditions it portrays are well
known to all inhabitants of our larger cities ... The congestion
caused by such misuse of the streets (for storage instead of
travel) and by the ever-increasing amount of motor vehicle
traffic has become a major problem of municipal administra-
tion, . .. a problem particularly acute in a city like Pittsburgh
where it is aggravated by the concentration of the downtown
business section in a "Golden Triangle" of comparatively
narrow streets and tall office and commercial buildings, many
of the occupants of which use private automobiles to and
from their offices and stores. Studies made by the Pittsburgh
Regional Planning Association and the Allegheny Conference
on Community Development reveal that parking facilities in
that city are grossly inadequate and that private enterprise
has not been able to solve the problem because private parking
lots are frequently temporary in nature and located without
much regard for actual parking requirements, vacant land
being utilized for parking purposes in more or less haphazard
fashion merely for the purpose of earning taxes on the
land pending profitable disposition of it for construction
purposes...19
18 359 Pa. 264, 59 A. (2d) 142 (1948).
19 359 Pa. 264 at 269, 59 A. (2d) 142 at 145.
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Similar doctrines have been enunciated in California, 20 Kentucky,2
Michigan, 22 New York,23 0hio 24 and other states.
C. MONOPOLISTIC CHARACTERISTICS
The monopolistic characteristics of public utilities generally
have already been indicated in preceding paragraphs herein. Off-
street parking accommodations, of a type urgently needed in cities
today, may also be monopolistic from several different points of
view, though the monopolistic character of such facilities certainly
is not as evident as are some of the other attributes of a public
utility. in a consideration of this particular aspect of the public
utility concept, it seems necessary to consider monopolistic ten-
dencies, first as they may apply to parking facilities now existing
in downtown urban areas, and second as they may apply to park-
ing facilities that are largely lacking today in such areas.
In a sense, present commercial off-street parking accommo-
dations offer the motorist-parker somewhat of a choice in his
selection of a particular facility, and competition does exist in
some locations and under some circumstances. It should be noted,
however, that such a choice, more often than not, is limited by
the ultimate destination of the parker and by his reluctance to
walk any great distance. The preferential location of many exist-
ing commercial facilities, therefore, contains at least to some
extent the element of monopoly.
Parking surveys conducted in a large number of cities reveal
that, to be effective, off-street parking facilities must be estab-
lished within a prescribed walking distance from the parking
generators, especially in the central core area. While the indicated
locations of needed parking facilities may not be absolutely rigid,
20 Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. (2d) 664, 151 P. (2d) 5, 153 A. L. R. 956 (1944).
21 Miller v. Georgetown, 301 Ky. 241, 191 S. W. (2d) 403 (1945).
22 Wayne Village President v. Wayne Village Clerk, sub. nora. Parr v. Ladd, 323
Mich. 592, 36 N. W. (2d) 157, 8 A. L. R. (2d) 357 (1949) ; Cleveland v. Detroit,
324 Mich. 527, 37 N. W. (2d) 625 (1949).
23 Pansmith v. Island Park, - Misc. -, 72 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (1947), appeal dis.
73 N. Y. S. (2d) 636 (1947).
24 Blakemore v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 74 Ohio App. 5, 57
N. E. (2d) 397 (1943).
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it may be said that the desirable locations are relatively fixed in
character. Parking facilities cannot be established just anywhere,
witness the fact that many parking facilities are never filled to
capacity because of the inappropriateness of their location in
relation to the parking demand.
Monopolistic tendencies may also be evident in any concerted
effort on the part of commercial operators of parking facilities
to fix the schedule of rates charged. The same result may obtain
in cities where a substantial number of parking facilities are
owned or operated by a single entrepreneur.
Aside from location and rates, off-street parking facilities
may tend to be monopolistic because of the relatively large amount
of capital required to establish accommodations of modern design.
Involved also is the concentration of its investment in fixed plant
and equipment. In fact, a trend toward the use of the parking
authority and the issuance of revenue bonds for parking facilities
has become evident during the last decade. That result, in part
at least, is attributable to some of the characteristics of a monop-
oly, namely, the limitations on ability to obtain desirable locations
and to finance their development.
Although the qualification of parking facilities as public utili-
ties solely from the standpoint of their monopolistic characteristics
may be far from conclusive, it should be observed that this attri-
bute may not be an indispensable element in the chain of qualifi-
cation. In any event, it seems desirable in the public interest to
restrict the number of off-street parking facilities in any particular
location to those indicated by present or potential demand, con-
sistent with an over-all traffic plan of the city and with traffic
facilities that can accommodate the entry and discharge of vehicles.
D. ASSOCIATION WITH TRANSPORTATION OR DISTRIBUTION
An examination of the types of enterprises which, in years
past, have been construed to be public utilities indicates that by
far the bulk of them have been related to transportation or dis-
tribution. In fact, transportation companies and warehouses were
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the first to be recognized as public utilities. Terminal facilities
generally, including wharves and docks, have since been added
to the category.
The intimate relationship between highway transportation
and terminal facilities for motor vehicles is obvious. In fact, high-
way transportation involves not only the movement of vehicles,
but the larger function of getting from one place to another. So
conceived, complete highway transportation accommodations must
include an over-all service from point of origin to point of des-
tination, in order to facilitate a full realization of the speed,
economy, and convenience of an efficient highway plant.
A recent decision involving Kansas City, in the case of Bow-
man v. Kansas City,25 upholds this doctrine. Judge Dalton, speak-
ing for a unanimous Missouri Supreme Court, there asserted:
The use of the streets for parking purposes has materially
interfered with their use for the movement of traffic and the
discharge of passengers and property from such vehicles.
Traffic congestion has become an acute problem in many of
the cities and towns in this state. The problem of parking or
the temporary disposition of these vehicles during business
hours when such vehicles are not in active operation is directly
connected with the problem of transportation. The parking
of such vehicles cannot be separated from their use in trans-
portation and their operation upon streets and highways. 26
It should not be difficult, therefore, to associate the operation of
a parking lot with other forms of transportation or distribution
which have become recognized forms of public utilities.
E. CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
In recent years, courts have tended to leave it to the legisla-
ture to declare an enterprise to be a public utility before passing
upon the issue as a question for judicial determination. The result
of this policy has been to make the determination of the public
25 - Mo. -, 233 S. W. (2d) 26 (1950).
26- Mo. - at -, 233 S. W. (2d) 26 at 34.
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utility status of an activity a matter for the joint legislative and
judicial process. In that connection, most state laws make some
provision for the use of the certificate of convenience and neces-
sity as an instrument of public utility regulation. Such a certificate
amounts to a revocable permit to serve the public by operating
as a public utility but the recipient acquires no property rights
thereunder.
Through this vehicle, legislatures have granted monopolistic
privileges, on the basis of public needs, only to persons who are
in a position to adequately serve these needs. The requirement
of the certificate may also enable the public regulatory agency to
prevent the needless multiplication of companies serving the same
territory and, by avoiding a wasteful duplication of capital facili-
ties, keep the investment at the lowest figure consonant with
satisfactory service. By protecting the utility from unnecessary
competition, risks inherent in utility investments are reduced and
the cost of capital is thereby kept relatively low. Incidentally,
public convenience refers to the accommodation which the entire
community will derive from the operation of the utility. In general,
the requisite showing with respect to convenience has been made
when the regulatory body is convinced that there is a reasonable
public demand for the service and that the utility will accom-
modate the public.
A requirement for a certificate of convenience and necessity
has long been upheld as a constitutional regulatory device where
the enterprise to which it is incident is affected with a public
interest.27 The applicant for such a certificate is customarily
required to file with the appropriate commission or board full
data with respect to the service to be rendered, the facilities to
be used, the rates and charges to be made, the financial status
of the applicant, and related matters. The commission or board
then holds public hearings on the application, thus providing an
opportunity for all who may be affected by the application to
appear and be heard.
27 In re Stanley, 133 Me. 91, 174 A. 93 (1934) ; Willis v. Buck, 281 Mont. 472, 263
P. 982 (1928) ; Barbour v. Walker, 126 Okla. 227, 259 P. 552 (1927).
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P. RATE REGULATION
It is now well established that a public utility, in return for
the service it furnishes, is entitled to a reasonable compensation,
in accordance with the service provided. This matter of rate deter-
mination offers perhaps the greatest challenge in the application
of the public utility concept to off-street parking facilities.
Rates for public utility service may be classified as (a) con-
tract or administrative rates voluntarily fixed or agreed upon
between the public utility and the consumer, or as (b) legislative
rates fixed by the legislature or the public utilities commission
as a governmental function without the consent of the parties. 28
A state may, under its police power, but within constitutional
limitations, regulate and prescribe reasonable rates which may
be made by public utilities for their services to the public. This
function of rate-making has been construed by the courts to be
legislative in character, whether the power is exercised by the
legislature itself or by a subordinate administrative or municipal
body to whom the authority has been delegated.29 The judiciary
may, however, in appropriate instances, restrain the imposition
of grossly excessive or confiscatory rates.
Once a municipality, under an appropriate delegation of
power, has fixed the rates for a public utility, some courts hold
that it must protect the utility against unfair competition by
reason of such regulation.30 When a governmental body has the
authority to regulate rates for public utility services to consumers,
that authority includes the power to fix any maximum rate which
is fair and just to the consumer if it will also result in a fair return
to the public utility.31 In the absence of a legislative prescription
of rates, the legal obligation of a public utility to serve all
28 Lenawee County Gas & E. Co. v. Adrian, 209 Mich. 52, 176 N. W. 590, 10 A. L. R.
1328 (1920).
29 Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 259 U. S. 318, 42 S. Ct. 486, 66
L. Ed. 961 (1921) ; Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co., 191 U. S. 358, 24 S.
Ct. 82, 48 L. Ed. 217 (1903), and many other cases.
30 Mapleton v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 209 Iowa 400, 223 N. W. 476, 68 A. L. R. 993
(1929).
31 Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U. S. 224, 58 S. Ct. 883, 82 L. Ed. 1304 (1937),
and many other cases.
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members of the public to whom its public use and scope of opera-
tion extend carries with it the duty to render such services at
reasonable rates. This obligation is implied from the acceptance
of the franchise and privilege to serve the public. Yet a public
utility is entitled to a just compensation, i.e., a fair return upon
the reasonable valuation of the property.
A long line of decisions has established the principle that
rates fixed by public authority which are not sufficient to yield a
fair or reasonable return on the value of the property are unjust,
unreasonable, and confiscatory; and that their enforcement de-
prives the public utility enterprise of its property in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution.3 2 The question then becomes one concerning the factors
to be considered in fixing or regulating rates. At least three funda-
mental bases of valuation of public utility property for rate-
making purposes were advanced in the earlier days of public
utility regulation. They were (1) the original cost or prudent
investment base, (2) the present value base, and (3) the cost to
reproduce base. Public utility property valuation today is not
resolved by formula, as such, but may depend upon many variables
characteristic of particular circumstances.33 A determination of
public utility rates must be based upon a resolution of the right
of the public to be served at a reasonable charge and the right
of the utility to a fair return on the value of its property.
It would seem, from a number of public utility cases, that
commission-fixed rates do not violate the due process clause of
the constitution if they are calculated to produce earnings high
enough to support the utility's financial structure even though
they are not high enough to provide a fair return upon the repro-
duction cost of the utility's property. It seems to be legally
acceptable if the commission bases its rate level findings upon the
prudent investment valuation of the utility property.84
32 Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 470, 58 S. Ct. 990,
82 L. Ed. 1469 (1937); West v. Chesapeake & P. Telephone Co., 295 U. S. 662,
55 S. Ct. 894, 79 L. Ed. 1640 (1934), and many other cases.
33 See annotation on the point in 20 A. L. R. 556.
34 Lewis, "Recent Developments in Public Utility Regulation," American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 58th Annual Meeting, p. 384 (1946).
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Over the years, some courts have revealed the elements which
they take into consideration in a determination of the reasonable-
ness of public utility rates. For example, it has been indicated
that the very lowest rate of return a public utility should receive
must be one that will induce investment when the enterprise is
prudently operated. 5 Other courts 'have held that a reasonable
rate of return is one that approximates the profits received upon
capital invested in other enterprises where the risk involved and
other conditions are similar.36 A fair return to which a public
utility is entitled must be determined by present-day conditions,
rather than by what has happened in the past 7 High rates, of
course, in themselves may not guarantee a fair return. A lower
rate may have a tendency to increase the use of a public utility
service, and thus result in a greater net return. These are only
a few of the many principles which have been enunciated by the
courts in public utility rate cases.
One might well inquire at this point: "What has all this to
do with parking facilities?" The answer lies in the fact that one
of the apparent needs of the present time, not to mention the
future, is an adequate amount of off-street parking facilities that
would prove to be attractive on the basis of their user-costs. If
the public utility concept is to be helpful in attaining this objective,
as proposed herein, it must make possible rates which are more
reasonable than those which now exist with respect to most
commercial off-street parking accommodations. Yet, one of the
important legal bases of the public utility concept requires that,
while rates must be reasonable, rates must result in a fair return
on the public utility properties.
Unless there is a bona fide trial on the merits, it would be
difficult to know whether or not a dilemma is here involved.
Perhaps this is the weakest link in the chain of qualifying parking
35 Petersburg Gas Co. v. Petersburg, 132 Va. 82, 110 S. E. 533, 20 A. L. R. 542
(1922). See also L. R. A. 1915A 30.
36 Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Commission, 262 U. S.
679, 43 S. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176 (1922).
37 United 1. & Electric Co. v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 S. Ct. 123, 74 L. Ed. 390
(1929).
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facilities as public utilities. It may be, however, that the present
rate structure of commercial parking facilities is too much a
function of inappropriate usage by motorist-parkers, of parking
facilities outmoded in design, of locations that are not close
enough to parking generators, and of other factors that probably
would not exist if parking facilities were regulated as a quasi-
public enterprise. If this is not true, then it would seem that the
public utility concept may not be helpful and that the last vestiges
of private ownership of parking facilities must crumble, to give
way to the public establishment of such accommodations as still
another form of publicly-operated convenience for the citizenry.
II. COMMERCIAL PARKING UNDER PUBLIC REGULATION
Private enterprise, addressing itself to the provision of off-
street parking facilities, has supplied at least some of the accom-
modations so urgently needed in urban areas today. Such effort
to supply a needed service, though sincere in its conception, has
not been free of abuses in its execution. Motor vehicles stored in
parking facilities have often been damaged by the negligent con-
duct of some operators of such parking lots. Legal redress for
such acts is usually expensive to obtain and often ineffective.
Personal property has frequently been stolen from parked vehicles
because of a lack of adequate protection against trespassers. The
free circulation of pedestrian and motor traffic is often obstructed
by the unlawful practices of some operators of parking facilities.
Price-gouging has not been an uncommon occurrence.
Because of these and other abuses, as well as the widespread
lack of minimum standards of performance by operators of off-
street parking facilities, at least forty-three cities in the United
States have been caused to enact appropriate local ordinances
authorizing the licensing of off-street parking facilities operated
for profit and prescribing minimum standards of design, main-
tenance and operation. In nineteen additional cities, a business
license is required, but design and operation are left unregulated,
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except as controlled by building codes.3 8 The regulatory and
enforcement functions authorized in these ordinances are lodged
in a great variety of municipal agencies, often with divided
responsibility. In San Francisco, for example, various aspects of
the regulation have been placed in the hands of the Chief of
Police, the Fire Department, the Director of Public Health, and
the Department of Public Works.
Generally, these regulatory ordinances do not apply to park-
ing facilities with a very small capacity, such as those providing
less than eight, nine or ten vehicle spaces, depending upon the
city involved. The removal and use of parked vehicles without
the knowledge or consent of their owners is prohibited in a few
cities. The possible range of license fees may be from $1.00 per
facility, as in Cleveland, to $100.00 for a facility having a capacity
of more than one hundred vehicles, as in New York City. Many
cities require that all licensees post prominently the rates charged,
the closing hours of the facility, and other important data.,Claim-
check practices are prescribed. A few ordinances attempt to pro-
tect the motorist-parker against disclaimers of damage liability
in case of accident or theft and to assist in the enforcement and
collection of judgments by requirements that bonds in designated
amounts be posted by licensees, or by some other appropriate
regulation. With respect to rate regulation, ordinance provisions
merely endeavor to guard against fraudulent extortion of fees
and misrepresentation involving the advertised schedule of rates.
No attempt is made to determine an economic or equitable rate
structure, but design, operation, and maintenance standards are
frequently prescribed.
3 9
One may conclude that the public control of commercial.off-
38 See LeCraw and Smith, Municipal Regulation of Parking Lots, Eno Foundation
for Highway Traffic Control, 1949, and unpublished studies of the Bureau of Public
Roads.
39 Two model laws, involving the public regulation of commercial off-street park-
ing facilities by cities, have been made available by the American Automobile
Association. One is a state enabling statute; the other, a local ordinance that might
be enacted pursuant to the statute. See "Proposed Statute to Define the Legal
Obligations of Proprietors of Garages and Motor Vehicle Parking Facilities," and
the "Proposed Ordinance Regulating Off-street Parking Facilities," issued by the
American Automobile Association, Washington, D. C., 1950.
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street parking facilities authorized under these laws may well be
the forerunner of full-fledged public utility regulation of such
facilities. As now constituted, of course, such regulation falls far
short of effective public control of commercial parking facilities
in a number of respects. The rate structure is frequently not
designed to encourage short-term parking and discourage all-day
storage, for example. Locations for new facilities, making parking
space available where needed in relation to the principal gen-
erators of parking demand, are not prescribed. Certificates of
convenience and necessity are not required. Competition is not
controlled in the public interest. Facilities are not necessarily
integrated with the over-all needs of the community. Other iden-
tifying characteristics of a public utility are largely absent.
III. CONCLUSION.
It has been pointed out that the chief objectives to be attained
in the governmental regulation of a public utility are adequate
service and reasonable rates for the consuming public. As public
utilities are inherently monopolistic, the consumer is without the
usual alternative of patronizing some other dealer or producer
rendering the same service. His best guarantee of adequate service
and fair prices, under the circumstances, seems to lie in effective
regulation by government authority. In the past, the outstanding
legal characteristics of a public utility have been worked out to
the point where it is clearly such if it (1) is affected with a public
interest, (2) involves a public use, (3) has monopolistic attributes,
and (4) is related to transportation or distribution. When meas-
ured in terms of these essential elements, it is amazing how easily
the operation of off-street parking facilities would seem to qualify
as a public utility, especially if it is appropriately identified as
such by state legislative act.
It is true that the public regulation of designated public utili-
ties is today an accepted fact. Yet it does not meet the unqualified
approval of all. With some measure of justification, some critics
disparage the partisanship that has often characterized the
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conduct of state regulatory agencies. Others may feel that such
regulation, as far as off-street parking facilities may be concerned,
amounts to only a temporizing measure; that ultimately the
municipality must own and operate all parking facilities in the
public interest.
Certainly the public utility concept constitutes no panacea
for all urban parking difficulties. It would seem to provide the
promise of compromise, however, between the extremes of public
and private control of off-street parking facilities in those munici-
palities where no action is forthcoming today. The qualification
of parking facilities as public utilities seems so feasible legally
tbat it warrants serious consideration by both public and private
enterprisers. It may yet serve as the catalyst that will constrain
these seemingly incompatible disputants to work together as a
team in the public interest.
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HASTE MAKES FOR WORSE THAN WASTE
Scarcely a single day passes without some reference in the metropolitan
newspapers to the "dope evil" or the "narcotics problem," for recent
years have disclosed an appalling increase in the illegal use of narcotic
drugs and a rising curve in the number of addicts. Worse yet, the age-level
of those involved, both peddlers and consumers, has declined until the
matter has now become one of those teen-age phenomena, one of those fads
and fancies, which would border on the ridiculous if it were not for the
tragic consequences so frequently found to follow in the train of drug
addiction. From the smoking of marijuana on a "dare" to a steadily
increasing consumption of heroin as the strength of the addiction grows
leads but naturally to larceny, robbery and even more serious crime in
order that the addict might secure the money to purchase larger and still
larger quantities of "dope." Annual statistics relating to crime are not
needed to arouse the citizenry in every large community to clamor for
action, for law enforcing agencies, from police departments on down, have
combined their talents, strength and energy to stamp out the drug evil.
The issue is not one new to lawyers and lawmakers, for, in addition to
a federal Harrison Act' and a federal drug Export and Import Act,2 many
states enacted varying state laws on the subject.' The federal statutes,
however, were primarily aimed at the production of revenue, although
criminal sanctions were imposed on all who possessed or dispensed drugs
without license or the payment of taxes, so local enforcement directed
against addiction naturally varied from state to state. As usage of narcotic
drugs became more and more a national problem, with corresponding
entanglement of social and economic factors, the need for uniform state
law became apparent.
With customary vigor, the Commissioners of Uniform Laws addressed
themselves to the challenge and, in 1932, drafted a Uniform Narcotic Drug
Act.4 It would be difficult, wrote the Commissioners, for "one not familiar
126 U. S. C. A. § 2550 et seq.
2 21 U. S. C. A. § 171 et seq.
3 Illinois, for example, enacted a narcotics law in 1931: Laws 1931, p. 455. It
was repealed in 1935, and replaced by the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act: Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.1, et seq. The Illinois statute, prior to amendment,
varied from the uniform law in a few particulars not here pertinent. As to its
constitutionality, see People v. Guagliata, 362 Ill. 427, 200 N. E. 169, 103 A. L. R.
1035 (1936).
4 See 9A Unif. Laws Anno., pp. 182-224.
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with the subject to understand how many different organizations and
associations have an interest in the provisions of" the proposed act. It had
to "protect those using narcotic drugs legally, as well as provide punish-
ment for those using such drugs illegally." Great care "had to be exercised
not to violate" treaty provisions regarding traffic in drugs, but at the
same time to permit some leeway to the individual states to provide their
"own methods for the care and cure of addicts. "5 In general, therefore,
the proposed uniform law was directed against those who illegally sold,
prescribed, administered, or dispensed narcotic drugs but the illegal posses-
sor, manufacturer or compounder thereof was not overlooked. Punishment
by fine or imprisonment, in varying amounts and for varying terms, in
either local jails or state penitentiaries, was recommended as a suitable
penalty. The comprehensive and carefully thought out uniform statute
drafted by these Commissioners proved to be so acceptable to the state
legislatures that, between 1932 and 1945, it was substituted for local
variants in forty-five jurisdictions.G
The wisdom underlying the enactment of legislation of this type should
be obvious to all. No one, in his right mind, would challenge either the
motives or the sincerity of purpose of those who worked to put the measure
on the statute books of the nation. For that matter, few would care to
question the expertness of the draftsmanship to be found in the uniform
law nor the successful culmination of the five years of careful thought and
consideration which went into its makeup. One may, however, well express
alarm when heedless individuals, whipped to a furor because of failure in
law enforcement, rush headlong into the danger of ill-conceived and poorly
thought out amendment, hastily enacted, of so well received a measure.
Public discussion then becomes the citizen's duty in a democracy where
freedom to think, speak and join in argument forms a cardinal principle
of government, even though it be to think, speak and argue on the ill-
favored side of the question.
Illinois has just experienced an illustration of the devastating conse-
quences which can follow upon an unthinking, headlong, blind rush into
legislative action at a time when few would wish to be quoted as being
opposed to the spirit underlying the militant demand of organized pressure
groups. In just thirty-seven days from the date of introduction to passage,
7
5 Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 9A Unif.
Laws Anno., pp. 183-4.
6 9A Unif. Laws Anno., p. 182.
7 House Bill No. 544 was introduced on March 28, 1951. It cleared both House
and Senate by May 3, 1951, and, being declared to be an emergency measure, was
placed in operation promptly upon the Governor's approval. Speed of passage can
be best judged by noting that a bill must be read at large on three different days
in both branches of the General Assembly and must be printed before a final vote
is taken: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. III, § 13.
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House Bill No. 544 has been added to existing legislation on the subject.
Omitting stylistic phraseology, it reads:
"Section 1. Section 23 of the "Uniform Narcotic Drug Act," approved
July 8, 1935, as amended, is amended to read as follows: Section 23. Who-
ever violates this Act by selling, prescribing, administering or dispensing
any narcotic drug, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term of
not less than one year nor more than five years for the first offense. Whoever
violates this Act by possessing, having under his control, manufacturing
or compounding any narcotic drug shall be fined for the first offense not
more than $5,000.00, or be imprisoned for a period of not less than one
year nor more than five years, or both. For any subsequent offense the
violator shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term from two
years to life.
"Whoever violates this Act by selling, prescribing, administering, or dis-
pensing any narcotic drug to any person under 21 years of age, shall be
imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term from two years to life.
"Whoever is authorized in this Act to manufacture, possess, have under
his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic
drug, who violates this Act by failing to comply with any provision pre-
scribed in this Act for the exercise of such authority, for a first offense,
shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or be imprisoned in the county jail
for a term of not more than one year, or both; and for any subsequent
offense shall be fined not more than $3,000.00 or be imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary for a term of not more than five years, or both.
"Any offense under this Act shall be deemed a subsequent offense if the
violator shall have been previously convicted of a felony under any law
of the United States of America, or of any State or Territory or of the
District of Columbia relating to narcotic drugs. ' s
There is occasion to express grave doubts about the constitutionality of the
measure 9 as well as to note no small amount of unconstitutionality in its
enforcement.10
S Section 2 of House Bill No. 544, being the emergency clause, has been omitted.
9 It being understood that the Governor had requested an opinion with regard
thereto from the Attorney General, which request was probably made pursuant to
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 4, inquiry was addressed to the latter for a
copy of such opinion. The Attorney General replied to the effect that his opinion
was a confidential communication to the chief executive of the state and not a
matter of public concern unless released by the Governor. A similar request to the
Governor was rejected.
10 Chicago newspapers have reported at least two sentences to five-year terms in
the city prison imposed by the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago. The juris-
diction of that court, for a single offense, is limited to "imprisonment otherwise than
In the penitentiary." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357. To support imprison-
ment in the penitentiary, prosecution must be by indictment of a grand jury,
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Examination of the uniform law discloses that the substantive defini-
tion of all offenses thereunder is provided by Sections 2, 3, 13 and 17
thereof and Section 20, equivalent to Section 23 of the Illinois version, was
reserved for the purpose of prescribing the penalties and nothing more.
There could be no constitutional criticism addressed to legislative action
designed to increase the penalties for violation of the substantive provisions,
provided the increased penalties were not given retroactive effect," but
House Bill No. 544 does not stop at that point. True, it does, in general,
increase the penalty for selling, prescribing, administering, or dispensing
any narcotic drug illegally to a present penalty of not less than one year
nor more than five years in the penitentiary where formerly the statute
called for a penalty by way of a maximum fine of $1,000.00 or imprison-
ment in the county jail for no longer than one year, or both fine and
imprisonment. The addition of certain habitual offender provisions may or
may not be objectionable depending on whether the prior conviction was
had before or after the effective date of the amended statute.12 Since the
holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of People v. Poppe,
13 it
would probably be futile to claim unconstitutionality in the addition of a
paragraph defining the habitual offender as one who has previously been
convicted of a felony "under any law of the United States of America, or
of any State or Territory or of the District of Columbia relating to narcotic
drugs," although interpretation may become necessary to decide .whether
''conviction" requires imprisonment in a penitentiary or not.14 The chief
vice, however, exists in certain other ideas injected into the phraseology
of Section 23 as amended.
In the first place, a special and a new provision has been made for the
offender guilty of "selling, prescribing, administering, or dispensing any
narcotic drug to any person under 21 years of age" by fixing a minimum
sentence of two years in the penitentiary with a maximum life sentence, in
contrast to the general condemnation against selling, prescribing, adminis-
tering or dispensing with its term of not less than one year nor more than
five years for a first offense. Nowhere in the substantive provisions of the
according to Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8, rather than by information or complaint,
for the offense is then of the grade of felony: Baits v. People, 123 I1. 428, 16 N. E.
483 (1888). There would seem to be a lack of jurisdiction to impose sentences of
the kind noted.
11111. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 14, contains the customary guarantee against ex post
facto legislation. No violation of U. S. Const., Amend. VIII, forbidding "cruel and
unusual punishment," would appear to be involved.
12 In People v. Hanke, 389 Ill. 602, 60 N. E. (2d) 395 (1945), it was held not to
be objectionable to include a new offense in the category of habitual offenses even
though the same was not so included at the time of the prior conviction.
13394 Ill. 216, 68 N. E. (2d) 254 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvrEw
157.
14 See People v. Iagiello, 403 Ill. 623, 87 N. E. (2d) 785 (1949).
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statute is there any specific condemnation of the conduct as it might relate
to victims "under 21 years of age." The absurdity of a statute calling for
a punishment without designating a crime calls for no added comment. 15
Even supposing the imposition of a different penalty to be constitu-
tional, there is still the question of the appropriateness of the system of
classification chosen by the legislature. The need for providing protection
to minors, in contrast to saving adults from harm, might well justify the
imposition of a heavier penalty on those who endanger the youthful portion
of the population. But has the legislature, in its haste, forgotten that
females become of age, in Illinois, for virtually every purpose, 6 when
they attain eighteen? If the amendment to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
has not changed the status of a female between eighteen and twenty-one,
the indefiniteness and confusion generated should alone be enough to make
the amendment void.
Again, whether by accident or design, the word "knowingly" has been
omitted from the sentence in Section 23 which deals with the punishment
to be imposed on one who possesses, has under his control, manufactures
or compounds any narcotic drug. Whether accidental or deliberate, the
omission would be just as deadly to validity. In People v. Edge,17 a prose-
cution based upon an alleged violation of the statute forbidding the posses-
sion of policy tickets,' 8 the conviction was reversed because of a failure to
charge that the policy-playing tickets were knowingly possessed. In that
regard, the court noted that the word "knowingly" is not supplied, in
substance, by the term "unlawfully." It said: "Inclusion of the word
'unlawfully' merely connotes that the possession was contrary to or in
defiance of law, whereas 'knowingly' implies that the act was performed
consciously, intelligently, and with actual knowledge of the facts . . ."19
Similarly, in People v. Beak,20 where the constitutionality of a criminal
statute was the prime issue, the court said that "in creating an offense by
statute which was not a crime at common law such statute must be suffi-
ciently certain to show what the legislature intended to prohibit and
punish, otherwise it will be void for uncertainty . . . If the law is of such
doubtful construction and describes the act denominated as a crime in
terms so general and indeterminate as to make the question of criminality
15 Compare, for example, the instant measure with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1,
Ch. 38, § 490, dealing with a contrast between the common law offense of forcible
rape and statutory rape, involving offenders and victims at varying age levels.
16 An exception existing in connection with the right to vote, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 3-1, rests on other grounds. A female, at eighteen, is qualified to
serve as a notary public, for example: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 99, § 1.
17 406 Ill. 490, 94 N. E. (2d) 359 (1950).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 413.
19 406 Ill. 490 at 494, 94 N. E. (2d) 359 at 361.
20291 Ill. 449, 126 N. E, 201 (1920).
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dependent upon the opinions of ... individuals ... and of such a nature
that honest and intelligent men are unable to ascertain what particular act
is condemned .. .the law is incapable of enforcement and will be held to
be null and void. "21 True, a presumption of constitutionality attends upon
every legislative enactment, but it would not be thought to be strong
enough to overcome the effect of the obvious error committed at this point.
A further point might be made of the fact that the statute, as amended,
fails to specify the place of detention where the optional sentence of
imprisonment, which may be imposed on those who are found guilty of
illegal possession of narcotic drugs, is to be served. In all other instances,
there is express declaration that the term of imprisonment is to be "in the
penitentiary," except as to those who, authorized to possess and use drugs,
should fail to comply with the provisions regarding licensing, labelling, and
record keeping. 22 Unless this failure may be said to be remedied by other
general provisions in the statute book,23 there would seem to be further
obvious uncertainty to a degree warranting a determination of unconstitu-
tionality, for no one can say whether the legislature intended to treat the
offense as a felony or a misdemeanor. When the requirements of criminal
procedure are kept in mind,24 there is some occasion to believe that the
proponents of the amendment, in their zeal to sharpen the teeth of the
law, have overreached themselves. They have, in fact, endangered the
whole scheme of the uniform law for, admitting the presence of a saving
clause,25 a determination that Section 23, as amended, is unconstitutional
would leave the statute wide open to criticism as being nothing more than
another utopian scheme lacking in practical effect.
While opinions may not differ as to the wisdom of seeking a change
in existing law, if in fact it is inadequate to suppress the evil of traffic
in, and use of, narcotic drugs, one may well be entitled to criticize the
efforts of zealots, no matter how much they may be appalled by the
increasing use of narcotic drugs, if their combined pressures have left the
state exposed to the danger of being without any relief short of a special
21 291 Ill. 449 at 452, 126 N. E. 201 at 202.
22 First offenders in that category are to be fined or "be imprisoned in the county
jail."
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 585, declares a felony to be an offense
"punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary." Other offenses, by
Section 586, are declared to be misdemeanors.
24 Prosecution for felony must be by indictment, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8, hence
must be heard only before the several circuit courts or by the Criminal Court of
Cook County: People v. Glowacki, 236 Ill. 612, 86 N. E. 368 (1908).
25 Section 22 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act provides that "if any provision
of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid,
such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act, which
can be given effect ... and to this end the provisions of the act are declared to be
severable." See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.25.
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session of the legislature to provide the serious consideration the matter
deserves. They ought to bear in mind Chief Justice Hughes' injunction
to "look after the courts of the poor, who stand most in need of justice,"
for it is before such tribunals that drug peddlers and addicts most fre-
quently appear. They need to be cautioned that the "security of the
republic will be found in the treatment of the poor and ignorant; in
indifference to their misery and helplessness lies disaster."
DANmEL A. WoLi*
THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR ESTATE,
GIFT AND INCOME TAX PURPOSES
Every student of economics fully realizes the fact that the value of
property is never constant at all times, being materially, and often seri-
ously, affected by periods of depression and recession as well as by those of
inflationary character. For this reason, and because many transfers of
property occur in the form of transfers in kind rather than in cash, it is
often difficult, but highly important from the tax standpoint, to arrive at an
accurate and proper valuation of property passing by way of inheritance,
gift or otherwise.' As rules governing valuation vary with the type of
property involved, rather than with the type of tax to be assessed, it is
possible to consider such rules without particular reference to either estate,
gift or income forms of taxation. For that matter, few instances exist
where litigated questions concerning the valuation of property have turned
on matters of law, for valuation is primarily a fact question to be resolved
under the circumstances of the given case and to be decided upon the basis
of the particular evidence produced. The essence of a case involving prop-
erty valuation, then, is not the putting up of a strong legal argument but
the proper presentation of all the relevant facts, strengthened by all
pertinent data and buttressed by the use of opinion evidence furnished
by those specialists whose expertness is beyond question.
The essential inquiry turns on the "fair market value" of the property
on the taxable date. In general, that "fair market value" has been said
to be the "price which would probably be agreed upon by a seller
* LL.B., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1919; Member, Illinois bar.
1 In most instances income, for income tax purposes, is payable in cash and
presents no valuation problem. Valuation may become a necessary step to a
determination of taxable income where: (1) compensation, dividends or rents are
payable in the form of property other than cash; (2) there is a distribution of
stock rights; or (3) property is received by a shareholder upon liquidation of a
corporation. Valuation problems could also arise in connection with an excess
profits tax.
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willing, but under no compulsion, to sell, and a buyer willing, but
under no compulsion, to buy, where both have reasonable knowledge
of the facts. '"2 Factors to be taken into consideration, therefore, would
typically group around three centers, to-wit: (1) the existence of a market
for the property under consideration; (2) the representative character of
sales made on that market; and (3) similarities and dissimilarities between
the property so sold and the particular property in question. As valuation
is a fact question, determinable from all proper evidence adduced, the
Court of Appeals for the United States cannot question the determination,
nor substitute its own judgment as to valuation, if the facts found by the
Tax Court are supported by proper and substantial evidence, not even
when, in the opinion of the higher court, the evidence points to a different
conclusion.3 It is obvious, therefore, that the principal effort should be put
forth before the issue of valuation reaches the appellate level.
While value, at any given time, is a "fact," it is based upon a number
of other facts such as the size, location and yield of real property, or the
presence or absence of corporate earnings in the case of shares of stock.
Despite its nature as a real, actual, definite thing, it is "an approximation,
a matter of opinion, a guess, although that of informed people," 4 hence
turns largely on opinion. Because opinions do frequently differ, valuations
based on substantial evidence are rarely rejected as courts are inclined to
respect the soundly-formed opinions of others.5 Conversely, property is
rarely considered as being absolutely valueless, particularly for estate or
gift tax purposes.6
It should be noted, of course, that the burden of proof as to correct
and proper valuation lies on the taxpayer's shoulders. If the Commissioner
2 Phillips v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 598 at 601 (1926). See also John J.
Newberry, 39 BTA 1123 (1939) ; Augustus E. Staley, 41 BTA 752 (1940), appeal dis.
C. C. A., 7th, 1940; and 28 U. S. C. A., §§ 11(b) ; 113(a) (4) ; 113(a) (5) ; 810-2; and
1005. For critical comment on the meaning of "value," see opinion of Frank, C. J.,
in Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 314 at 317 (1943).
3 Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 37, 57 S. Ct. 324, 81 L. Ed.
491 (1937) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289
(1931) ; F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 913 (1946) ; Seaside
Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 990 (1939), cert. den. 308 U. S. 618,
60 S. Ct. 263, 84 L. Ed. 516 (1939) ; Neal v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 806 (1931) ;
Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632, 53 S. Ct. 83,
77 L. Ed. 548 (1932) ; Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F. (2d) 191 (1928) ; James Couzens,
11 BTA 1040 (1928).
4 Montrose Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 238 (1939), affirmed in
309 U. S. 622, 60 S. Ct. 511, 84 L. Ed. 985 (1940). See also Heiner v. Gwinner,
114 F. (2d) 723 (1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 714, 61 S. Ct. 396, 85 L. Ed. 465 (1940) ;
Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 314 (1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 748, 64 S. Ct.
51, 88 L. Ed. 444 (1943) ; Rockford Malleable Iron Works, 2 BTA 817 (1925).
5 Meadow Land & Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F. (2d) 297 (1941).
6 Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404, 51 S. Ct. 550, 75 L. Ed. 1143 (1931) ; Guggenheim
v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 469 (1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 621, 62 S. Ct. 66, 86 L.
Ed. 499 (1941).
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expresses disagreement, he has the power to redetermine value and the
resulting tax liability. For this purpose, he may have recourse to any
proper evidence tending to establish value, such as the opinions of expert
appraisers, reference to comparative sales, or purchase options given by
the taxpayer. In case he does, the taxpayer is handicapped, for the Com-
missioner's assessment is presumed to be correct and the taxpayer would
be forced to rebut the presumption.7 To support a successful challenge
to the correctness of a deficiency assessment made by the Commissioner,
the taxpayer must produce evidence which would not only enable but also
require the Tax Court to make an independent determination on the facts,
particularly since, in the absence of such concrete facts, the presumption
of correctness favoring the Commissioner would not be overthrown.8
The burden of proof resting on the taxpayer would appear to be
heavier in the case of a suit to secure a tax refund than is true where
review is sought, in the Tax Court, on a redetermination of valuation.
Choice of procedure, therefore, should be given more than off-hand consid-
eration. Negotiation of a closing agreement is possible where valuation
controversies have led to consummated transactions, but the Commissioner
will refuse to settle, as a matter of policy, where the proposed transaction
is only in the planning stage. 9 One further general fact should be noticed,
and that is the taxpayer should beware of the possibility of error in his
own valuation, for he will generally be bound by the figure he himself has
set' 0 and can obtain relief only where he clearly committed the error."
Proceeding now to specific illustrations regarding valuation problems,
attention is at once drawn to the fact that value must be determined as of
some particular date, the precise date depending on the purpose for the
valuation. The particular date may be important in determining the per-
7 Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 55 S. Ct. 287, 79 L. Ed. 623 (1935) ; Welch
v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 54 S. Ct. 8, 78 L. Ed. 212 (1933); Fleming v. Commis-
sioner, 153 F. (2d) 361 (1946) ; Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 314 (1943),
cert. den. 320 U. S. 748, 64 S. Ct. 51, 88 L. Ed. 444 (1943) ; Allen v. Commissioner,
117 F. (2d) 364 (1941); Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d)
990 (1939), cert. den. 308 U. S. 618, 60 S. Ct. 263, 84 L. Ed. 516 (1939) ; True v.
United States, 51 F. Supp. 720 (1943) ; Mimnaugh v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 411
(1928), cert. den. 280 U. S. 563, 50 S. Ct. 24, 74 L. Ed. 617 (1929) ; Anson v. Prouty,
5 BTA 107 (1926). See also Rule 32, Rules of Practice Before the Tax Court.
8 National Weeklies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F. (2d) 39 (1943) ; Anthony P.
Miller, Inc., 7 T. C. 729 (1946), affirmed in 164 F. (2d) 268 (1947), cert. den. 333
U. S. 861, 68 S. Ct. 741, 92 L. Ed. 1140 (1948) ; Harriet A. Langdon, 7 BTA 1142
(1927).
9 26 U. S. C. A. § 3760.
10 Andrews v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 55 (1930) ; Thompson v. United States,
8 F. (2d) 175 (1925) ; Allie E. Nicholson, 21 BTA 795 (1930) ; Ethel P. Hunt, 12
BTA 396 (1928).
11Havemeyer v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 537 (1945), cert. den. 326 U. S. 759,
66 S. Ct. 138, 90 L. Ed. 456 (1945); Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll,
32 F. Supp. 661 (1940) ; Estate of W. E. Telling, T. D. Memo. 106694 (1944).
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centage of gain or loss arising from the sale of property acquired before
that date. It may have bearing on the value of the property, other than
cash, received as taxable income. In case of gift taxes, the precise date of
the gift might need to be determined. In estate tax cases, of course, the
controlling date is the date of death of the decedent whose estate is subject
to tax, unless the optional valuation date is utilized. Even though an appro-
priate date has been selected, the door is not closed to inquiry into future
developments occurring after that date, for valuation has sometimes been
based on prognostication as to future earnings or the prospects of future
growth of the community where the property is located, since these factors
have bearing on "fair market value.''12 Valuation generally, however, is
measured by factors then in existence.
Real estate valuation is usually achieved on the basis of opinion testi-
mony furnished by qualified experts or on appraisals provided by qualified
appraisers. The expert or the appraiser must, of course, be shown to be
familiar not only with the particular property involved but also with other
properties of similar character. His opinion must also have been formulated
on the basis of a proper approach before it will be accepted. To find
recognition, the expert valuation should be predicated on facts not conclu-
sions, on observable data and not "hunches."' u The size and shape of the
lot, its location, its actual or potential use, the footage fronting on impor-
tant streets or avenues, the nature of zoning or similar restrictions, the
size, age, and nature of existing improvements together with their state
of repair or disrepair and their fitness for existing or particular uses, are
all elements having bearing on value.14 Improved premises, of course,
should be valued as a unit for most purposes, although separate determi-
nations as between the land value and the value of the improvements are
necessary for the calculation of depreciation in income tax matters.1 5
In the absence of special controlling factors disclosed by the evidence, an
12 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151, 46 S. Ct. 291, 73 L. Ed. 647
(1929) ; Guggenheim v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 469 (1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 621,
62 S. Ct. 66, 86 L. Ed. 499 (1941) ; Portage Silica Co. v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d)
985 (1931), cert. den. 284 U. S. 667, 52 S. Ct. 42, 76 L. Ed. 565 (1931) ; Myer Dana,
30 BTA 83 (1934) ; James Couzens, 11 BTA 1040 (1928).
'3 F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 913 (1946) ; Phipps v.
Commissioner, 127 F. (2d) 214 (1942), cert. den. 317 U. S. 645, 63 S. Ct. 38, 87 L.
Ed. 519 (1942) ; First Nat. Bank of Memphis v. Commissioner, 125 F. (2d) 157
(1942) ; Heiner v. Gwinner, 114 F. (2d) 723 (1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 714, 61 S.
Ct. 396, 85 L. Ed. 465 (1940); Belridge Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 85 F. (2d) 762
(1936) ; Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632,
53 S. Ct. 83, 77 L. Ed. 548 (1932) ; Boggs & Buhl, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 F. (2d)
859 (1929) ; Overlander v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 531 (1929) ; First Nat. Bank of
Birmingham (Schuler Trust), 29 BTA 352 (1933) ; Joseph J. Walsh, 7 BTA 1104
(1927).
14 Elizabeth P. Patterson, 33 BTA 57 (1935) ; John M. Galvin, 6 BTA 1085 (1927).
15 Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632, 53 S. Ct.
83, 77 L. Ed. 548 (1932).
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undivided fractional interest is usually valued at a proportionate share
of the value of the whole. 6
Comparative sales prices furnish desirable evidence of real estate
value, provided the test sales are not made under compulsion, because they
reflect the opinion of the market.17 Offers to buy and sell, on the other
hand, have little bearing on the question of value, being no more than
evidence of the offeror's opinion on the point, hence will be regarded as
inadmissible evidence when standing alone. When supported by additional
evidence to the effect that the offer was made in good faith by a responsible
buyer possessed of a full knowledge of the facts, evidence of that character
may be received.' Rental value, or investment value, may not only be
relevant but may be decisive, for earning power may furnish a reliable
guide. 19 Assessed valuation may throw some light on the subject, but a
person relying thereon should be prepared to prove that the tax assessor's
judgment in the matter is based on full fair market value. 20 Book values,
or actual or replacement values, have sometimes been utilized, but again
they furnish inadequate proof unless tied up with fair value.
21
Special valuation problems are encountered, from the income tax
standpoint, in connection with mineral estates in land such as those relat.
ing to mines, oil and gas wells, and other natural resources,22 as well as
in the case of all types of tax where the interest acquired is less than a
fee simple. Leasehold interests may possess a value if there is an annual
saving arising from the ownership of the leasehold interest. Value is then
calculated on the basis of capitalizing the amount of the savings. But this
16 Adelaide McColgan, 10 BTA 958 (1928) ; Clifford A. Cook, 2 BTA 126 (1925)
Estate of Johnson, TO Memo. Dkt. No. 111795 (1943).
17 Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632, 53 S. Ct.
83, 77 L. Ed. 548 (1932) ; Huron Building Co., 15 BTA 1107 (1929).
18 Sharp v. United States, 191 U. S. 341, 24 S. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211 (1903)
South Alabama Land Co. v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 27 (1930) ; Manufacturers
Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 684 (1937).
19 See cases cited in note 17, ante, and Montrose Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner,
105 F. (2d) 238 (1939), affirmed in 309 U. S. 622, 60 S. Ct. 511, 84 L. Ed. 985 (1940).
20 Tabor Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 34 F. (2d) 140 (1929).
21 Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S. 254, 61 S. Ct. 507, 85 L. Ed. 813 (1941)
Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 990 (1939), cert. den. 308
U. S. 618, 60 S. Ct. 263, 84 L. Ed. 516 (1939) ; South Alabama Land Co. v. Com-
missioner, 104 F. (2d) 27 (1930) ; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d)
272 (1938) ; Henry Cleland Estate Co., 29 BTA 436 (1933) ; Estate of Jeremiah P.
Downing, 12 BTA 1180 (1928) ; Lexington Realty Co., 12 BTA 850 (1928) ; Jerecki
Mfg. Co., 12 BTA 165 (1928). For estate and gift tax purposes, only the net value
of the property transferred is taken into consideration as the taxpayer is entitled
to deduct the unpaid amount of any mortgage or other charge and, in the case of
estate taxes, all other debts and claims against the estate: Smith v. Shaughnessy,
318 U. S. 176, 63 S. Ct. 545, 87 L. Ed. 690 (1943).
22 For the law on this specialized subject, see Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 97 F. (2d) 272 (1938) ; A. G. & S. Mining Co., 8 BTA 1260 (1927) ; Olinda
Land Co., TC Memo. Dkt. No. 23 (1945) ; and Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-7.
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is true only if the rights granted exceed, in value, the amount of the
payments required or other obligations imposed on the lessee, for otherwise
the leasehold interest would not possess a market value.
23
The valuation of personal property follows closely along the line
laid down for real estate valuation, the prime issue being to determine
the "fair market value" thereof on the controlling date. Most of the liti-
gated questions, however, have arisen in connection with the valuation of
intangible personal property such as shares of stock, notes and mortgages.
Fair market value for such property, of course, is generally the amount of
cash which could be realized under a free and unhampered sale. 24 Active
listed securities typically will be valued on the basis of a mean between
the high and low prices recorded on the exchange on the particular day, or
on a date closest thereto, since the sales there recorded most closely reflect
the presence of a free market between willing sellers and buyers.
Inactive or unlisted issues are likely to present problems by reason
of the difficulty of finding an acceptable comparative basis. Other sales
made on days too remote from the valuation date will be disregarded, 25 as
would also be the case with respect to sales not made at arm's length. 2
Clearly, then, prices obtained under forced or compulsory sales should not
be recognized 27 any more than should be true where the case discloses a
manipulated, misinformed or an exhausted market.28 Courts will also be
reluctant to disregard market prices on the basis of argument that such
prices have been unduly affected by boom or depression, but may yield if
strong evidence can be produced to overcome such reluctance. 29 The valua-
23Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 381 (1931), cert. den. 284
U. S. 690, 52 S. Ct. 266, 76 L. Ed. 582 (1932) ; William Penn Hotel Co., 23 BTA 566
(1931) ; Polar Ice Cream & Supply Co., 13 BTA 1054 (1928) ; Mandel Bros., 4 BTA
341 (1926).
24 W. T. Grant Co. v. Duggan, 94 F. (2d) 859 (1938) ; Hazeltine Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 89 F. (2d) 513 (1937) ; Commissioner v. Robertson, 75 F. (2d) 540
(1935), cert. den. 295 U. S. 763, 55 S. Ct. 922, 79 L. Ed. 1705 (1935) ; Walter v.
Duffy, 287 F. 41 (1923) ; Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, 32 F. Supp. 661
(1940) Estate of Spencer, 5 TC 904 (1945); Augustus E. Staley, 41 BTA 752
(1940); appeal dis. C. C. A., 7th; John J. Flynn, 35 BTA 1064 (1937).
25 True v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 720 (1943) ; Julius G. Day, 3 BTA 942 (1926).
26 Kinney's Estate v. Commissioner, 80 P. (2d) 568 (1935) ; True v. United States,
51 F. Supp. 720 (1943); Mathilde B. Hooper, 41 BTA 114 (1940) ; Gillette Rubber
Co., 31 BTA 483 (1934); Premier Packing Co., 12 BTA 637 (1928).
27 C. A. Bryan, 19 BTA 111 (1930) ; Fruen Investment Co., 2 BTA 542 (1925).
28 Zanuck v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 714 (1945) ; Andrews v. Commissioner,
135 F. (2d) 314 (1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 748, 64 S. Ct. 51, 88 L. Ed. 444 (1943) ;
Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 876 (1945), cert. den. 328 U. S.
847, 66 S. Ct. 1118, 90 L. Ed. 1620 (1946) ; Estate of Millie Langley Wright, 43 BTA
551 (1941) ; Wallis Tractor Co., 3 BTA 981 (1926) ; John J. Batterman, T. C. Memo.
Dkt. No. 110244 (1943), affirmed in 142 F. (2d) 448 (1944), cert. den. 322 U. S. 756,
64 S. Ct. 1266, 88 L. Ed. 1585 (1944) ; Estate of Telling, T. C. Memo. Dkt. No. 106694
(1944).
29 Rogers v. Strong, 72 F. (2d) 455 (1934), cert. den. 293 U. S. 621, 55 S. Ct. 217,
79 L. Ed. 709 (1934) ; Crane v. Harrison, 68 F. Supp. 439 (1946).
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tion of large blocks of stock on the basis of sales prices obtained for small
lots would be improper because of the presence of unusual factors in the
case of the former. 30 For this reason, a "blockage rule" has been formu-
lated31 which should be taken into account.
32
In the absence of market valuation, stocks may be valued by com-
parison with shares of similar enterprises possessing a market sales value,38
or by reference to internal data relating to the particular corporation
whose shares are involved. For this last purpose, such factors as net asset
value, earning power, dividend-paying capacity, both past and prospective,
and book value of shares may become important. Offers and options to
purchase shares may be considered in an effort to arrive at a fair value.
3 4
Conversely, the presence of valid restrictions on the sale of shares should
be noted for these may materially affect value by limiting the potential
market.8 5
Other securities, such as notes and mortgages, will generally be valued
on the basis of the amount of unpaid principal plus interest accrued to the
valuation date. In the case of notes, attention should be given to such
factors as (1) collectibility or subsequent actual collection, if had; (2) the
terms of the note, including the element of negotiability; and (3) the pres-
ence or absence of collateral security and the worth thereof.36 To these
30 Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 513 (1937); Wood v. United
States, 29 F. Supp. 853 (1939) ; Estate of Vandenhoeck, 4 TC 125 (1944) ; In re
Leadbetter, TC Memo. Dkt. No. 110858 (1943).
31 Reg. 111, § 29-113(a) (14)-1; Reg. 108, § 86.14(c) ; Reg. 105, § 81.10(c).
32 See Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F. (2d) 102 (1946), cert. den. 326 U. S.
796, 66 S. Ct. 490, 90 L. Ed. 485 (1946) ; Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F. (2d) 317
(1943) ; Helvering v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 95 F. (2d) 806 (1938) :
Henry F. DuPont, 2 TC 246 (1943) ; John J. Newberry, 39 BTA 1123 (1939) ; James
Couzens, 11 BTA 1040 (1928).
33 Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U. S. 202, 35 S. Ct. 795, 59 L. Ed. 1272 (1915);
Cotton v. Commissioner, 165 F. (2d) 987 (1948) ; Horlick v. Kuhl, 62 F. Supp. 168
(1945); Frederick A. Koch, Jr., 28 BTA 363 (1933); Rose Spitzer, TC Memo. Dkt.
No. 7551 (1947). See also Reg. 108, §§ 113(a) (14) ; 811(k) ; 86.19(o) ; 29.113(a)
(14)-1; and Reg. 108, § 81.10(c).
34 Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F. (2d) 385 (1944); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.
(2d) 682 (1932) ; Cartier v. Commissioner, 37 F. (2d) 894 (1930) ; Rice v. Eisner,
16 F. (2d) 35a (1926), cert. den. 273 U. S. 764, 47 S. Ct. 477, 71 L. Ed. 880 (1927);
George B. Markle, Jr., 10 BTA 763 (1928).
a5 Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106, 56 S. Ct. 375, 80 L. Ed. 511 (1936) ; Com-
missioner v. McCann, 146 F. (2d) 385 (1944) ; Heiner v. Gwinner, 114 F. (2d) 723
(1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 714, 61 S. Ct. 396, 85 L. Ed. 465 (1940) ; LaMotte T.
Cohu, 8 TC 796 (1947) ; Edith G. Goidwasser, 47 BTA 445 (1942), affirmed in 142
F. (2d) 556 (1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 765, 65 S. Ct. 119, 89 L. Ed. 612 (1944),
rehear, den. 324 U. S. 890, 65 S. Ct. 1020, 89 L. Ed. 1437 (1945).
36 Estate of Oliver v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 210 (1945) ; McLaughlin v.
Commissioner, 113 F. (2d) 611 (1940); Rusk v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 428
(1931) ; Nichols v. Commissioner, 44 F. (2d) 157 (1930) ; Estate of Hodge, 2 TC
643 (1943) ; Estate of Springer, 45 BTA 561 (1941) ; Mary M. Buck, 25 BTA 780
(1932) ; I. N. Burman, 23 BTA 369 (1931) ; S. L. Meyer, 23 BTA 1201 (1931) ; John
Laing, 22 BTA 380 (1931); Paul M. Potter, TC Memo. Dkt. No. 7473 (1946) ; and
Reg. 105, § 81.10(1) ; Reg. 108, § 86.19(e).
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factors, in the case of mortgages, should be added all available information
relating to trends in the general mortgage market.37 The worth of securities
pledged as collateral to secure indebtedness must be included in the
deceased owner's gross estate at full market value, but credit for the
outstanding indebtedness may be taken as a claim against the estate.38
This brief summary should serve to emphasize the point, previously
noted, that valuation is essentially a fact question, hence the marshalling
and preserving of all pertinent data is a matter of prime importance.
The attorney should be prepared to substantiate all valuations made with
acceptable documentary evidence as well as with convincing and admissible
testimony.
JOSEPH BRMAN *
37 Lehigh Bldg. Corp., 7 BTA 460 (1927) ; Leon N. Dibble, 6 BTA 732 (1927);
Estate of Rosenbaum, TC Memo. Dkt. No. 2711 (1944).
38 Lyman v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 811 (1936) ; Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Smith, 54 F. Supp. 579 (1940) ; Estate of Borland, 38 BTA 598 (1938) ; Reg.
105, § 81.10(c).
* LL.B., New York University, 1914; Member, New York and federal bars, New
York County Lawyers Association; former attorney, Law Department, City of
New York, and Office of Price Administration.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CoNsTiTunIoNAJ LAW-DuE PROCESS-WHETHER SEGREGATION ORDI-
NANCE WHICH PoiHnrr PERSONS OF DIFFERENT RACES OR COLOR FROM
LIVING IN THE SAME LocAIATY ARE CONSTITUTIONA--The case of City of
Birmingham v. Monk,1 recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, presented for adjudication a question concerning the con-
stitutionality of a segregation zoning ordinance adopted by the municipality
there concerned. The action was one to secure a declaratory judgment of
1 185 F. (2d) 859 (1951). Russell, J., wrote a dissenting opinion. It is under-
stood that certiorari has been denied.
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invalidity on the ground the ordinance, one making it unlawful for any
person of either the white or negro race to establish a residence in an
area zoned for members of the other race, violated rights guaranteed to
the plaintiffs by the Fourteenth Amendment and by certain civil rights
legislation.2 Plaintiffs were Negroes who had purchased residential prop-
erty within the city but which was located in a section where occupation
was limited, by the ordinance, to members of the white race. The district
court declared the ordinance to be void and enjoined enforcement thereof
on the principle that the provision was not a legitimate exercise of the
police power. The defendant municipality appealed asserting error in the
exclusion of evidence tending to show breach of the peace, riots, and
destruction of property and life which neither it nor other law enforce-
ment officers could prevent. Such evidence had been offered to justify the
enactment as being no more than a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The majority of the higher court, voting to affirm the decree, stated that
no state or municipality could exercise its police power in such a way as
to bring it into direct conflict with the federal constitution, hence the
ordinance could not possibly be valid. The dissenting judge, willing to
treat the evidence as being admissible for its possible bearing on the issue
of whether or not the particular ordinance was unconstitutional, pointed
to the fact that other constitutional rights have been restricted when the
circumstance required it, confirming his argument by quoting Justice
Holmes' celebrated remark that the "most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. "3
A query as to the constitutionality of segregation zoning ordinances
has served as the threshold of inquiry before many courts, but while the
problem is not a new one, the decisions have been at variance with each
other. The case of In re Lee Sing4 represents one of the earliest tests of
enactments of the kind in question. It concerned the so-called "Bingham"
ordinance passed by the City of San Francisco, an ordinance which
required all Chinese inhabitants to move from a portion of the city previ-
ously occupied by them to a point outside the city and county. The court,
declaring the ordinance to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment,
pointed out that the obvious purpose was to drive away all citizens of
Chinese ancestry without being aimed at any particular vice or unwhole-
some or immoral practice so was not designed to effectuate any legitimate
28 U. S. C. A. §§ 41-2.
3 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 at 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 at 473
(1919).
443 F. 359 (1890). The court intimated that if there had been evidence of
existing vice and other unwholesome practices the ordinance might have been
sustained.
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police power of the city. So bald an affront to civil rights could hardly be
expected to stand.
A nisi prius decision rendered in Virginia in 1913, however, reached
a directly opposite conclusion for it was there found that an ordinance
which prohibited persons of the white and colored races from living in
the same locality was a valid and proper exercise of the police power
because intended to preserve peace and good order. 5 To reach that result,
the court took judicial notice of the fact that close association on the part
of the persons designated had resulted, or tended to result, in breach of the
peace, immorality and danger to the health of the community.6 Judicial
notice there served as the foundation for a showing of a reasonable relation
between the segregation ordinance and the exercise of the police power.
It could be considered analogous to the proof which the dissenting judge
was willing to admit in the instant case.
A later Virginia case, that of Hopkins v. City of Richmond,7 followed
the pattern laid down when it upheld another segregation ordinance. At
that time it said: "Whether a particular ordinance is unreasonable, and
therefore void, is a question for the court, but in determining it the court
will have regard to all the circumstances of the city and the objects sought
to be attained, and the necessity which exists for the ordinance."s To that
point, then, it would seem as if evidence tending to disclose a vital need
for the segregation plan in a given community woud lead to the conclusion
that the particular regulation might be held valid.
Other segregation ordinances have failed to stand the test but for
other reasons. The one concerned in State of Maryland v. Gurry9 was
declared void because it was said to be unreasonable in the light of the
general welfare clause of the city charter. There was indication, however,
that but for such welfare clause the ordinance would have been sustained
for the court adverted to the friction which had developed from occupancy
by colored persons of houses in areas previously occupied entirely by white
people and the reasonableness of seeking to prevent conflict if that was
possible. The court also pointed to the fact that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, while broad and comprehensive, was not designed to interfere with
a proper exercise of the police power.
In much the same way, the ordinance involved in the North Carolina
5 Ashland v. Coleman, 19 Va. L. Reg. 427 (1913).
6 Accord: Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915) ; Harden
v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917).
7 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915). Keith, J., dissented.
8 117 Va. 692 at 708-9, 86 S. E. 139 at 144.
9 121 Md. 534, 88 A. 546, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1087 (1913).
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case of State v. Darnell'o was declared void for violation of the general
welfare clause of the city charter, making it unnecessary for the court to
go deeper into the constitutional issues. It did say, however, that as such
an ordinance would tend to forbid an owner of property from selling or
leasing to whomsoever he might see fit there might be occasion to find
constitutional objection to an ordinance which took away "one of the
inalienable rights incident to the ownership of property.""
The earlier Georgia cases appear to have gone deeper into the consti-
tutional issues concerned, but again the inquiry was not directed to the
exercise of the police power. In Carey v. City of Atlanta1 2 the ordinance
was stricken down because it would have operated to deprive one who
was already the owner of property of the right to reside therein, which
deprivation would, in substance, amount to an unjustified taking of the
property itself. Upon repassage of the ordinance with a clause expressly
excluding from its operation those persons who had acquired vested
rights, the ordinance was held valid, in Harden v. City of Atlanta,13 over
the dissent of the judge who had written the earlier opinion but who this
time objected that the new ordinance was objectionable because it was
opposed to a basic principle in denying one the right to acquire a home
of his choice simply on the basis of his race or color.
The death blow to ordinances of this character seemed to fall with
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Buchanan
v. Warley,14 a suit brought by a white person, as seller, to compel specific
performance of a real estate contract relating to land in Louisville, Ken-
tucky. The defendant, a Negro purchaser, resisted suit on the ground that
a local ordinance would have made it unlawful for him to occupy the
premises. The United States Supreme Court expressed the question to be
one as to whether or not occupancy, and necessarily the purchase and sale
of property of which occupancy was but an incident, could be inhibited
by a state or one of its municipalities solely because of the color of the
proposed occupant. 15 It answered that question with an emphatic declara-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to assure
10166 N. C. 300, 81 S. E. 338, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332 (1914).
11 166 N. C. 300 at 302, 81 S. E. 338 at 339.
12 143 Ga. 192, 84 S. D. 456, L. R. A. 1915D 684, Ann. Case. 1916E 1151 (1915).
13 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917). Atkinson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
14 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149, L. R. A. 1918C 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A
1201 (1917), reversing Harris v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S. W. 472,
Ann. Cas. 1917B 149 (1915).
15 245 U. S. 60 at 75, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 at 161. The preamble of the
ordinance recited that the purpose was "to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between
the white and colored races" and to "preserve the public peace and promote the
general welfare by making reasonable provisions requiring as far as practicable
the use of separate blocks for residences . . .by white and colored people respec-
tively."
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equal right to all, regardless of color, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold
and convey real and personal property, and that any municipal ordinance
which purported to place restriction thereon was void.16 On the authority
of that decision, all subsequent cases have usually produced a summary
declaration of invalidity as to those segregation ordinances which have
been brought into question.
17
The decision in the Buchanan case as well as those holdings which
follow it have not gone without criticism' s particularly as to the true
point of conflict between certain of the city councils and the Supreme
Court. The issue would not, as the court says, seem to be "solely" one of
restriction based on color or race but would rather involve the larger
question of segregation versus police power. The former would attempt
to justify the separation of the races by showing the incidence of riots and
breaches of the peace which can, and often does, flow from close associa-
tion. 19 The latter, more recently concerned with individual rather than
public rights, has tended to jump over the crux of the problem without
full examination thereof and to adjudge this and other forms of segrega-
tion on the basis that all are ipso fwcto unconstitutional. If the real test
of all zoning, racial or otherwise, is the proper preservation of that public
welfare which is intimately involved, there should be some conscious
examination into that point before proceeding to pass on other constitu-
tional issues. Granted that no ordinance should stand if its sole purpose is
to discriminate, there is still occasion to give some heed to other aspects
of state power.
J. L. MORRIS
16 Following that decision, the Atlanta ordinance which had been reviewed in
Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S. E. 401 (1917), was again tested in
Glover v. City of Atlanta, 148 Ga. 285, 96 S. E. 562 (1918), and this time was
declared Invalid. On similar reasoning, an ordinance of the type upheld in Hopkins
v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139 (1915), was rejected in Irvine v.
City of Clifton Forge, 124 Va. 781, 97 S. E. 310 (1918).
17 City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704, 50 S. Ct. 407, 74 L. Ed. 1128 (1930),
affirming 37 F. (2d) 712 (1930) ; Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668, 47 S. Ct. 471,
71 L. Ed. 831 (1927), reversing 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925) ; Bowen v. City of
Atlanta, 159 Ga. 145, 125 S. E. 199 (1924) ; Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A.
910 (1918); Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119, 6 S. E. (2d) 867,
126 A. L. R. 634 (1940) ; Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P. (2d) 1054
(1936) ; City of Dallas v. Library Annex Corp., 295 S. W. 591 (Tex. Comm. App.,
1927).
18 Martin, "Segregation of Residences of Negroes," 32 Mich. L. Rev. 721-42 (1933),
and notes in 29 Ky. L. J. 213, 16 Mich. L. Rev. 109, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 137.
19 A recent Associated Press dispatch reports the destruction by fire of two houses
in Birmingham, Alabama, which had been bombed during a racial zoning dispute
arising when Negroes began moving into an area formerly zoned for white occu-
pancy: Chicago Tribune, Vol. CX, No. 109,. Part 4, p. 1, May 7, 1951. The story
does not reveal whether the premises concerned are the same as the ones involved
in the instant case.
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CONTRACTS-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER OR NOT A BANK MAY,
BY AGREEMENT WITH ITS CUSTOMER, COMPLETELY EXONERATE ITSELF FROM
LIABILITY FOR ITS NEGLIGENCE IN MAINTAINING A NIGHT DEPOSITORY-While
reviewing courts in this country have frequently been presented with the
question of the validity of bailment contracts which purport to limit the lia-
bility of a bailee for his negligence, definitiveness hardly characterizes the
result of decisions thus far attained. Taken together, however, the cases do
indicate an apparent trend, one exemplified by the recent Ohio case of Kolt
v. Cleveland Trust Company.' The defendant there, a bank which provided
night depository facilities to its customers, entered into a written agree-
ment with the plaintiff permitting him to use its facilities for the payment
of a fee. The contract provided that the use of the depository by the
plaintiff was to be at his sole risk and stipulated that the relationship of
debtor and creditor should not arise out of such use. The plaintiff brought
action to recover for a deposit allegedly made by him but receipt of which
was denied by the defendant. At the time of submitting the case to the
jury, the lower court instructed that if the plaintiff had shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he had placed the money in question
in the night depository, it was then incumbent upon the defendant bank
to show that it had exercised ordinary care over the custody of the money
and also directed the jury to ignore any provision in the contract to the
contrary. The Ohio Court of Appeals, on appeal from a verdict and judg-
ment against the bank, after determining that the relationship between the
parties was one of bailor and bailee, held the instruction to be erroneous
on the ground that the bank was absolved from liability by the terms of
the agreement and that the public policy of the state was not opposed to
enforcing such a provision under the circumstances before it.
Although it would appear that no reviewing court in this country has
ever been called upon to consider the point of law concerned as it relates
to the specific facts of the case, 2 the question of the ability of contracting
parties generally, and especially of parties to bailment contracts, to exon-
erate themselves from liability for their negligent acts committed while in
the performance of such contracts has been the subject of many decisions.
One of the first cases to raise the problem was the English case of Maving
v. Todd3 where, by agreement of the parties, the defendant was relieved
from liability for any loss which might result from fire. Lord Ellenborough
is there reported to have held that "a wharfinger . . .may entirely get rid
1 - Ohio App. -, 93 N. E. (2d) 788 (1950). McNamee, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
2 But see Bernstein v. Northwestern Nat. Bank in Philadelphia, 159 Pa. Super. 73,
41 A. (2d) 440 (1945), for dicta Intimating the possibility that a bank, providing
a night depositary, might limit its liability to a depositor by agreement.
3 4 Camp. 225, 171 Eng. Rep. 72 (1815).
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of his liability for loss by fire." Claiming descent from that case, there
is a seemingly settled area of English law which appears to champion the
right of a bailee to exonerate himself by agreement from any liability for
his negligence.
4
American courts, on the other hand, have viewed these exoneration
agreements with a degree of hostility, crediting their position to an expres-
sion of public policy. 5 The basis for that policy has not always been
entirely clear, but it would appear that courts have feared that if a bailee
for hire was allowed to free himself from that duty to exercise ordinary
care which the law would normally impose upon him the result would be
to produce a tendency to perform contracts containing such stipulations
in a careless fashion.6 In opposition to this position, however, is an equally
well established policy permitting the utmost freedom of contract to com-
petent parties which presents, with force, the counter-argument that what
one may refuse to do entirely, he may well agree to do but conditionally.
7
Apparently both these policies are sufficiently persuasive that courts are
still engaged in the process of resolving the conflict thus presented.
The first reaction of American courts when faced with the problem of
resolving these opposing policies seems to have been one of reluctance to
meet the issue squarely and to rule on the essential validity of the exonera-
tion provisions involved in the agreements coming before them. Instead,
and as an alternative, the principle of strict construction was adopted, so
that unless freedom from liability for negligence was expressly included,
contracts were to be construed as if they made no reference to it.8 This
was clearly an effort to achieve solution by evasion for, in many cases, the
particular stipulation was rendered meaningless after the element of free-
dom from negligence was obliterated because not precisely framed in apt
language. Although the Arkansas court concerned with the case of Gu/f
Compass Compamy v. Harrington9 recognized this to be the case, it never-
4 See, for example, Rutter v. Palmer (1922), 2 K. B. 87, 14 B. R. C. 101; Travers
& Sons v. Cooper (1915), 1 K. B. (C. A.) 73.
5 England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 271 P. 532 (1928)
Denver Union Terminal Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 P. 602, 27 A. L. R. 154
(1922) : Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 294, 64 A. (2d) 51 (1949) ; Agricultural Ins.
Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N. E. (2d) 658 (1944).
6 Such an apprehension was voiced in Kenney v. Wong, 81 N. H. 427, 128 A. 343
(1925).
7 Mann v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 135 Mich. 210, 97 N. W. 721 (1903).
8 Dieterle v. Bekin, 143 Cal. 683, 77 P. 664 (1904) ; Pure Torpedo Corp. v. Nation,
327 Ill. App. 28, 63 N. E. (2d) 600 (1945) ; Weinberger v. Werremeyer, 224 Ill. App.
217 (1922) ; Woodward v. Royal Carpet Cleaning Co., 16 La. App. 555, 134 So. 443
(1931) ; Railton v. Taylor, 20 R. I. 300, 38 A. 980 (1897) ; Langford v. Nevin, 117
Tex. 130, 298 S. W. 536 (1937). But see Mann v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 135 Mich.
210, 97 N. W. 721 (1903), where the court held it was error to fail to construe a
typical exoneration clause as intended to include negligence.
990 Ark. 256, 119 S. W. 249, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1205 (1909).
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theless applied the rule of strict construction toward a warehouse receipt
which purported to relieve the warehouseman from liability for loss result-
ing from fire, thereby denying protection of the immunity clause where
the fire had resulted from the warehouseman's own negligence. It said, in
part, that it might be argued that this construction entirely emasculated
the stipulation and rendered it meaningless. Nevertheless, it continued, the
"argument affords no reason for importing into the contract a stipulation
for exemption from liability for negligence which the parties themselves
have not seen fit to express in apt words-a stipulation, too, which the law
at least discourages when it does not positively forbid."10 The case may
be said to reflect a typical approach to the subject but one hardly likely
to aid in developing the law on the point.
AAn area of compromise has been reached, in resolving the conflict
between the so-called "public policy" and the one respecting freedom of
contract, in those cases wherein bailees for hire have been allowed the
benefit of exculpatory language designed to limit the monetary extent of
liability, provided the limitation bears a reasonable relation to the value
of the bailed article and the consideration paid the bailee for his services.
Typical of these situations are those cases which involve persons engaged
in the business of checking parcels." Although such persons would be
liable for negligent harms inflicted up to the stipulated amount, the grant-
ing of validity to stipulations designed to exonerate from liability for any
excess damage, even when caused by the bailee's own negligence, repre-
sents a broad concession.
Closely related thereto are those cases in which the courts have recog-
nized the validity of agreements intended to limit a bailee's liability to the
amount of the declared valuation of the bailed article. 1 2 Such agreements
are generally employed where a graduated fee is charged by the bailee
commensurate with the declared value of the property, a method frequently
employed by warehousemen. It is interesting to note, -in that regard, that
while the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 1 3 prohibits a warehouseman
from inserting a clause in his receipt tending to impair his obligation to
exercise reasonable care, an indication of the legislatively-expressed public
10 90 Ark. 256 at 259, 119 S. W. 249 at 250.
11 Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 409 (1920); Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 68
Mont. 231, 217 P. 673, 37 A. L. R. 754 (1923); Terry v. Southern Ry. Co., 81 S. C.
279, 62 S. E. 249, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 295 (1908).
12 The court concerned with the case of D'Utassy v. Barrett, 219 N. Y. 420, 114
N. E. 786, 5 A. L. R. 979 (1916), pointed to a distinction between provisions intended
to limit liability to a fixed amount and those designed to limit liability to the
declared valuation of the bailed property. Compare that case, however, with the
holdings in Brown v. Hines, 213 Mo. App. 298, 249 S. W. 683 (1923), and Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Higbee Co., 80 Ohio App. 437, 76 N. E. (2d) 404, 174
A. L. R. 1429 (1947).
13 Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 3, p. 13, § 3(b).
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policy specifically applicable to warehousemen, some courts, even in those
jurisdictions which have adopted the uniform act, have construed the
provision as not being sufficient to prohibit the so-called "declared valua-
tion" agreements.
14
Actually, the true problem is not merely whether or not a bailee for
hire may limit his liability but when and to what extent he may do so.
General expressions to the effect that exoneration agreements are contrary
to public policy should not be relied upon too wholeheartedly because
courts expressing the thought more likely mean that, under the particular
circumstances involved in the case being considered, it would be contrary
to public policy to allow the particular bailee to absolve himself from
liability for his negligence. This fact is made the more apparent if the
comparison is not attempted between the decisions found in a series of
states but is confined to holdings of different courts in any one state.15
While the basis for reconciling these decisions has not yet been reduced
to a formula susceptible of universal application, several explanations have
been suggested.
One factor appearing to possess a placatory effect on the judicial
hostility toward exoneration agreements exists where the amount of the
compensation paid the bailee is such that it would not justify the cost
involved in taking those precautionary measures which would normally be
necessary to insulate him from a charge of negligence. The extreme to
which a court may be moved by the presence of such an argument is well
illustrated by the case of Burrill v. The Dollar Savings Bank,16 although
the case actually involved not a bailment but the validity of a by-law of a
bank designed to limit its liability to its depositors. The court there,
accepting the provision to be valid, indicated its concern over situations
where a good deal of effort would be required to prevent loss in return for
only a modest compensation. It said that savings banks were really "chari-
ties for the poor. With many thousands of depositors they can only save
themselves from imposition and loss by rules strictly enforced. The rule
under which the defendants claim protection is a very reasonable one, and
necessary for their safety.''17 Even stronger intimation of the weight
which the element of compensation bears in determining the validity of
exoneration agreements is to be found in those cases which recognize the
14 George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal. (2d) 834, 205 P. (2d) 1037 (1949) ;
French v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 118 Colo. 424, 195 P. (2d) 968 (1948). See
also Williston, Contracts, Vol. 4, § 1046.
15 Compare, for example, Werner v. Knoll, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 474, 201 P. (2d) 45
(1948), with England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 271 P. 532
(1928).
16 92 Pa. 134, 37 Am. Rep. 669 (1879).
17 92 Pa. 134 at 138, 37 Am. Rep. 669 at 670.
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ability of a bailee for hire to limit his liability for his negligence provided
the bailor has an option to secure full liability upon payment of an addi-
tional reasonable charge. At least one court has upheld such an agreement
where the bailee was a common carrier, hence would normally be subject
to the duty to exercise the highest degree of care.' s
A more recent proposal suggests that courts should give consideration
to the comparative bargaining power of the parties.19 Where the bailee,
for example, occupies a superior position by virtue of a monopoly over
facilities for affording the type of service the bailor needs, or at least where
the bailor may not readily resort to someone else for that service, or where
the bailor is not in a position to object to the provisions of a bailment
agreement prepared by the bailee, courts will be prone to announce the
rule that exculpatory provisions contained in an agreement formed under
such circumstances are contrary to public policy. 20 A similar result is
likely to be reached where the bailee is engaged in a course of general
dealing with the public indiscriminately, somewhat in the fashion which
would be true of railroads and other utilities, so as to affect the business
with a public, as contrasted to an essentially private, interest. 21 Cases
involving bailees engaged in operating parking lots22 or garages 23 bear
witness to a hesitancy on the part of courts to enforce exculpatory pro-
visions in their agreements, which tendency disappears when the parties
are on an equal footing at the moment of bargaining.
24
Although the court in the instant case recognized the importance of
weighing the comparative bargaining power of the parties, it was con-
18 Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P. 936 (1928).
19 The suggestion appears in a note in 37 Col. L. Rev. 248 and in an annotation in
175 A. L. R. 16.
20 Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F. (2d) 939 (1945); Bennett v.
American Nat. Bank, 130 Okla. 23, 264 P. 912 (1928) ; Sporsem v. First Nat. Bank,
133 Wash. 199, 233 P. 641, 40 A. L. R. 854 (1925).
21 Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 P. 602, 27 A. L. R.
754 (1922). In Restatement, Contracts, Vol. 2, § 575(b), the statement is made
that a bargain for exemption from liability for negligence is illegal if ". . . one of
the parties is charged with a public service, and the bargain relates to negligence
in the performance of any part of its duty to the public for which it has received or
been promised compensation."
22 Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 294, 64 A. (2d) 51 (1949) ; Wendt v. Sley System
Garages, 124 Pa. Super. 224, 188 A. 624 (1936) ; Balone v. Heavey, 103 Pa. Super.
529, 158 A. 181 (1932).
2 3Grove v. Borchers, - Ohio App. -, 80 N. E. (2d) 208 (1948) ; Simms v. Sulli-
van, 100 Ore. 487, 19 P. 240, 15 A. L. R. 678 (1921) ; Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Co.,
67 Ore. 528, 136 P. 642 (1913).
24 Charles Lachman Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 79 F. Supp. 206 (1948); Stephens
v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 Cal. 86, 41 P. 783, 29 L. R. A. 751 (1895); Evans &
Pennington v. Nail, 1 Ga. App. 42, 57 S. E. 1020 (1907) ; Chekley v. Illinois Central
R. Co., 171 Ill. App. 203 (1912) ; Smith v. Library Board, 58 Minn. 108, 59 N. W.
979, 25 L. R. A. 280 (1894) ; Sanchez v. Blumberg, 176 S. W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1915).
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fronted by an additional consideration. Admittedly, the bank was conduct-
ing a business vitally touching the public interest and was in a position
to dictate the terms upon which it would accept deposits, terms which the
depositor was hardly in a position to dispute. It was a fact, however, that
it would be unlikely that a representative of the bank would be present
when night deposits were being made so that the only person apt to have
actual knowledge of the fact of the deposit would be the depositor himself.
As a result, the bank would be at the mercy of a dishonest depositor for
it would be without the means to prove that an alleged deposit had not, in
fact, been made.25 This aspect of the case, foreign to the ordinary bailment
arrangement, called for special dispensation under which the bank might
protect itself by stipulating for a complete exoneration until after the
night vault had been opened, the contents examined, and the same accepted
for credit to the customer's account. Thereafter, of course, the relationship
would be one of debtor and creditor rather than bailor and bailee. To
refuse complete exoneration and to limit the contract to one fixing a
maximum liability, as was urged by the dissenting judge, would not resolve
the bank's predicament; it would still be defenseless against dishonest
claims to the extent to which it would be contractually liable. On this
ground, then, the result reached in the instant case appears to be entirely
reasonable.
It would seem, however, that caution should be exercised in recognizing
the validity of exoneration agreements in all except such special cases.
As one writer puts it, the effect of "letting the bars of public policy down
and freedom of contract in, where the policy has been tried, has not proven
an unquestioned and indisputable success. "26 To allow a reaction against
the inequity of holding all exoneration agreements to be invalid to become
a pendulum swinging too far in the other extreme would merely result in
the substitution of injustice to the bailor for that which previously had
been endured by the bailee.
A. B. KALNITZ
25 The banking practice appeared to be one under which the night depository was
opened only by joint action of two bank employees, one possessing a key and the
other informed as to the vault combination, who then tallied the padlocked num-
bered sacks which contained the deposits made by the customers, which sacks were
'thereafter placed in the cashier's cage to await call by the customer who would, on
arrival, open the sack, remove and bank the contents. Assuming such practice to
have been followed at all times, and assuming the honesty of the bank employees,
there would seem to be little likelihood that the customer would be placed at the
mercy of the bank because he was unable to receive an immediate receipt for, or a
record of, his deposit. He could, as in the instant case, use the services of an eye-
witness if he needed corroboration evidence.
26 Willis, "The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Negligence,"
20 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1907), at p. 312.
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CORPORATIONS-CAPITAL, STOCK, AND DIVIDENDS-WHETHER PROVISIONS
OF UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT MAKE DELIVERY NON-ESSENTIAL TO A
VALED Gir OF SHARE OF CORPORATE STOCK-The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the recent case of Nagano v. McGrath,
Attorney General,' decided for the first time the effect to be given to
the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 2 relating to delivery in
connection with the transfer of title of shares of stock. The plaintiff, a
native-born citizen of Japan, entered the United States as a permanent
resident and engaged in the manufacture of oriental food products.
3
Later, the plaintiff transferred his business to a corporation, causing nearly
all of the shares of its stock to be issued in his own name or in the name
of his wife. 4 When the corporation, some years later, declared a stock
dividend, the plaintiff, who dominated the enterprise, caused a single
certificate for the additional shares to be issued in his wife's name, includ-
ing therein his portion of the stock dividend. This supplemental certificate
was never actually delivered to the :Wife but was kept by the plaintiff.
For that matter, he never informed his wife of the action which had been
taken. Following the outbreak of war with Japan, and before plaintiff's
wife had returned to this country, the Alien Property Custodian seized all
of the shares of stock standing in the wife's name under the authority of
the Trading with the Enemy Act.5 Plaintiff thereafter sued to recover the
additional shares, claiming title on the ground that he had never made
a valid gift of his portion of the stock dividend and asserting to be a
bailee for his wife's original stock. The plaintiff appealed from an order
dismissing the complaint,6 which order had been entered by the District
1187 F. (2d) 753 (1951), reversing 85 F. Supp. 368 (1949).
2 6 Unif. Laws Anno., p. 1 et seq. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32,
§ 416 et seq.
3 Subsequent thereto, on a visit to Japan, the plaintiff married a native citizen
of that country. The wife remained in Japan until the birth of a daughter, then
came to the United States as a permanent resident. The passage of the Immigra-
tion Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, 8 U. S. C. A. § 145 et seq., made it impossible for the
daughter, as well as a second daughter born in Japan while the parents were there
on a visit, not previously admitted to the United States, to join her parents in this
country. The wife, therefore, remained in Japan with the intention of returning to
this country when the daughters had grown up and had married.
4 187 F. (2d) 753 at 755. It was admitted that the original shares of stock issued
in the wife's name constituted a valid gift to her by the plaintiff.
5 50 U. S. C. A., App. § 9(a), as amended December 18, 1941.
6 The appeal in the instant case was limited to the question of plaintiff's right
to the shares which he claimed as his own property. His right to the possession
of the balance of the stock as bailee for his wife, dependent on her right as owner,
was made the subject of a separate appeal: Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F. (2d) 759
(1951).
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Court on the basis of the prior Illinois decision in Chicago Title & Trust
Company v. Ward,7 a case which held that a transfer of shares on the
books of the corporation operated to pass legal title to the person named
in the stock certificate. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the deci-
sion on the ground that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act s had effectively
changed prior case law in Illinois and required delivery as well as, and in
addition to, endorsement, assignment or transfer on the books of the cor-
poration in order to pass a complete title to the stock.
To reach this conclusion, the court found it necessary to construe the
applicable section pertaining to the delivery 9 together with another section
dealing with the effect of an attempt to transfer title without delivery of
the certificate. 10 The court stated: "To say that a transfer on the books
of a corporation constitutes a delivery within the contemplation of the Act
would be to render meaningless that statutory requirement that there be
a delivery even in the case where the corporation has expressly provided
that its shares are transferable on its books and by no other method."' 1
The decision would seem to conform to the fundamental purpose of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, as that purpose is disclosed in the Commis-
sioners' note, 12 which purpose seems to be to make the stock certificate
representative of the shares to the fullest extent possible. All other deci-
7 332 Ill. 126, 163 N. E. 319 (1928). Although the case was decided after Illinois
had adopted the uniform statute, the transfer took place long prior to its passage.
The decision makes no reference to the statute nor does it purport to be grounded
thereon.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 416, provides: "Title to a certificate and
to the shares represented thereby can be transferred only: (a) By delivery of the
certificate indorsed either in blank or to a specified person by the person appearing
by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby, or (b) By
delivery of the certificatee [sic] and a separate document containing a written
assignment of the certificate or a power of attorney to sell, assign, or transfer the
same or the shares represented thereby, signed by the person appearing by the
certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby. Such assignment or
power of attorney may be either in blank or to a specified person." There is a
proviso to the effect that the statute shall be applicable even though the charter or
articles of incorporation, or the certificate itself, shall provide that the shares shall
be transferable only on the books of the corporation.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 416.
10 Ibid., § 425, provides: "An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or to the
shares represented thereby without delivery of the certificate shall have the effect
of a promise to transfer and the obligation, if any, imposed by such promise shall
be determined by the law governing the formation and performance of contracts."
11 187 F. (2d) 753 at 757.
12 At 6 Unif. Laws Anno., p. 2, appears the statement: "The provisions of this
section are in accordance with the existing law, except that the transfer of the
certificate is here made to operate as a transfer of the shares, whereas at common
law it is the registry on the books of the company which makes the complete
transfer. The reason for the change is in order that the certificate may, to the
fullest extent possible, be the representative of the shares. This is the fundamental
purpose of the whole act, and is in accordance with the mercantile usage. The
transfer on the books becomes thus like the record of a deed of real estate under a
registry system."
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sions directly in point have reached the same conclusion, 13 and textual
writers also agree therewith. 14 Other provisions of the Act would also
indicate a legislative intent to make the requirement of delivery into
a mandatory one, for Section 10 provides that an attempted transfer of
shares without delivery of the certificate has no more effect than that of
a promise to transfer,' 5 while Section 13 provides that no attachment or
levy upon shares of stock shall be valid until the certificate has been
actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy.16
Although there have been a few decisions which might seem to have
reached a contrary conclusion, all such cases can be differentiated on the
basis of the factual situation involved. At common law, the voluntary
transfer of possession from one person to another constituted a delivery.
17
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act has not changed this rule, so delivery
of the stock certificate to a third person may be sufficient. In the case of
Snidow v. National Bank of Narrows,'8 for example, the donor wrote a
letter addressed to the donee, stating his intention to make a gift, and put
the letter and the certificates in a safety deposit vault, giving the key to
the bank cashier with instructions to deliver the same to the donee. The
court held these acts amounted to a valid delivery. A subsequent decision
in the same jurisdiction reached the same conclusion where the donor had
requested a friend, already in possession of the stock certificate, to transfer
the same to the donee.1 9 The court held the gift was consummated on the
delivery of written instructions to make the transfer. Written instructions
to a bailee, in possession of the stock certificates, to hold them for the
donee have been held to constitute a gift provided the bailee, expressly or
impliedly, assents to the instruction. 20 Delivery to the donor's agent,
however, will be ineffectual 2 ' for the agent is no more than the alter ego
13 In re Broomhall, Killough & Co., Inc., 47 F. (2d) 948 (1930) ; Daws v. Drusilla
Home, 118 Ind. App. 639, 79 N. E. (2d) 420 (1948) ; Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La.
282, 108 So. 483 (1926); Parker v. Colonial Building-Loan Ass'n, 111 N. J. Eq. 49,
161 A. 353, 99 A. L. R. 1077 (1932) ; Besson v. Stevvens, 94 N. J. Eq. 549, 120 A. 640
(1923) ; Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S. W. (2d) 629. (1944).
14 Christy and McLean, The Transfer of Stock (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York,
1940) ; Modesitt, "Application of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to Gifts of Stock,"
20 Rocky Mount. L. Rev. 67 (1947) ; Mechem, "Gifts of Corporation Shares," 20 Ill.
L. Rev. 9 (1925) ; 38 C. J. S., Gifts, § 46.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 425.
16 Ibid., § 428.
17 38 C. J. S., Gifts, § 46.
18 178 Va. 239, 16 S. E. (2d) 385 (1941), noted in 28 Va. L. Rev. 418.
19 Payne v. Tobacco Trading Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S. E. (2d) 281 (1942).
20 Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 562 (1942).
21 Cross v. Cross, 20 N. J. Misc. 359, 27 A. (2d) 877 (1942).
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of the principal and possession by the agent is deemed to be possession on
the part of the principal. Just as at common law, a symbolic delivery, such
as the delivery of a letter 22 or a key to a safety deposit vault containing
the stock,23 may be sufficient.
The problem of delivery would appear to be a somewhat complicated
one where the donor wishes to make the donee a joint owner of the stock,
but courts quite generally have held, in such situations, that delivery to
one of the joint owners is sufficient. 24 This view is in accordance with a
general rule to the effect that, where cotenants own personalty not easily
divisible, the possession of one cotenant is, in contemplation of law, the
possession of the other.25 It is also possible for a donor to constitute
himself trustee for the benefit of the donee so as to prevent the rise of any
question as to delivery. 26 If the donor should appoint a third person as
trustee, however, a failure to deliver the stock certificate will cause the
trust to fail for want of a trust res to support it27 since, in the absence of
consideration, the implied promise to convey legal title could not be
enforced.
An examination of all of the decided cases pertaining to delivery of
a gift of stock wherein the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
were applicable discloses that delivery has been regarded as a mandatory
requirement. Cases seemingly in contradiction involve nothing more than
variations in the manner of delivery which would not have been excep-
tional under the general rule made applicable to gifts at common law.
The instant case, therefore, merely reiterates the common law rule and
demonstrates that shares of stock, for this purpose, by statutory mandate,
are to be treated on the same basis as other common-law choses in action.
It is noteworthy, however, for having served to abrogate a common law
rule to the effect that a transfer on the books of the corporation would be
sufficient to vest legal title in the donee.
H. E. GORMAN
22 Hillary Holding Corp. v. Brooklyn Jockey Club, 88 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (1949),
decision pursuant to opinion in 273 App. Div. 538, 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 151 (1948).
23 In Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922).
24 Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 34 A. (2d) 428 (1943) ; Imparato v. Luscardi,
123 N. J. Eq. 298, 197 A. 379 (1938) ; East Rutherford Say., Loan & Build. Ass'n v.
McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq. 375, 100 A. 931 (1917) ; Gugle v. Ghgle, 83 Ohio App. 85,
78 N. E. (2d) 585 (1948) ; In re Connell's Estate, 282 Pa. 55.5, 128 A. 503 (1925).
25 14 Am. Jur., Cotenancy, § 23.
26 Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1934) ; Fall River National Bank
v. Estes, 279 Mass. 380, 181 N. E. 242 (1932).
27 Johnson v. Johnson, 300 Mass. 24, 13 N. E. (2d) 788 (1938).
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CORPORATIONS--OFFICERS AND AGENTS-WHETHER OR NOT A DIRECTOR
MAY SECUI REIMBURSEMENT FROM HIS CORPORATION FOR HIS ATTORNEYS'
FEES WHEN HE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE DEFENSE OF A STOCKHOLDER'S
DERIVATIVE ACTION-A problem which heretofore has received little judicial
attention but which is, nevertheless, one of importance, was recently passed
on by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of In re E. C. Warner
Company.' The problem concerned the right of a director to be reimbursed
2
by his corporation for his attorneys' fees after he had been judicially
vindicated in a suit brought against him for an alleged dereliction of duty.
The facts of the case disclosed that shortly after a derivative action had
been concluded in favor of the director, the corporation entered into volun-
tary dissolution and a receiver was appointed. Pursuant to an order
directing creditors to present claims, the attorneys who had represented
the director in the derivative action advanced a demand for the services
they had rendered in his behalf.3 The receiver, in doubt as to the propriety
of the claim, sought a determination as to its validity and the claim was
allowed by the trial court. That holding was affirmed on an appeal taken
by certain interested stockholders. In arriving at that conclusion, the
higher court reasoned that the director not only had a right to resist the
suit but was also under a duty to do so since, if he allowed the action
to go unchallenged, it would result in the removal from corporate guidance
of one to whom that guidance had been committed by the stockholders.
The court also indicated that if a contrary rule prevailed it would succeed
in deterring men of ability and substance from assuming the responsibili-
ties of a director.
The rule has become well established that when a stockholder is
successful in the prosecution of a derivative action he is entitled to reim-
bursement for counsel fees expended toward that end, 4 particularly so if
the action has conferred a tangible benefit on the corporation by creating,
increasing or protecting a corporate fund.5 The corporation, although
1 Minn. -, 45 N. W. (2d) 388 (1950).
2 Reimbursement, as used herein, will be considered synonymous with exoneration
since it makes no difference whether the corporation pays the fees directly to
counsel or merely reimburses the director for sums already spent.
3 The opinion does not reveal the basis for the right of the attorneys to present
the claim in their own names. It seems clear that, without an assignment or some
other contractual right, there would be a procedural defect since proceedings to
recover for attorneys' fees are typically brought by the litigant in his own name.
4 Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504 (1942) ; Auer v. Win. Meyer
Co., 322 Ill. App. 244, 54 N. R. (2d) 394 (1944). See also Hornstein, "The Counsel
Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits," 39 Col. L. Rev. 784 (1939), and annotation in
152 A. L. R. 909 at 914.
5 Bingham v. Ditzler, 320 Ill. App. 88, 49 N. E. (2d) 812 (1943), noted in 22
CnHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 159. It was there suggested that it might be desirable
to have a statute permitting the corporation to obtain, reimbursement from the
director.
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nominally a defendant in such suit, is in reality the successful party and
equitably should bear the cost of litigation which has resulted in its
advantage. With such a rule acting as a constant stimulus to disgruntled
stockholders to bring derivative actions to the vexation of directors, it
seems anomalous that only four courts should have had occasion to pass
upon the problem presented by the instant case.6
In the first of these decisions, that by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in the case of Figge v. Bergenthal,7 the court, allowing reimbursement to
the directors, simply said: "Clearly, if no case is made against defendants
it is not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay for the defense
of the action."s Twenty-five years later, the Ohio court concerned in the
case of Griesse v. Lang,9 incorrectly deeming the Figge case to have been
overruled by a subsequent Wisconsin case,' 0 decided that reimbursement
should be denied to the judicially vindicated directors. In reaching that
result, the court relied on the familiar general rule that corporation funds
may only be expended or used to the advantage of the corporation or for
purposes stated in the charter unless assent is given by all the stock-
holders." It, therefore, took a strict approach to the problem, making it
encumbent upon the directors to show that their defense of the action had
produced a benefit for the corporation, a point exceedingly difficult to
establish. 12 It has remained for two subsequent cases, however, to crystal-
6 A note in 25 Corn. L. Q. 437 suggests that the reasons for the paucity of cases
on the question are: (1) that usually no claim for reimbursement is made, and
(2) that appropriation for the expense incurred is made by the corporation without
objection from the stockholders.
7 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581 (1906). It should be noted that the case was not
strictly a derivative suit but was a remedial action for fraud and mismanagement
based on a statute. That factor, however, should not affect the validity of the case
for the present purpose.
8 130 Wis. 594 at 625, 109 N. W. 581 at 592. A headnote to Stendall v. Long-
shoreman's P. U. B. Ass'n, 116 La. 974, 41 So. 228 (1906), states: "The expenses
of a suit against the officers of a corporation to oust them from office are at the
charge of the corporation, and not of the officers." While the statement would
appear to support the language of the Wisconsin court, it is valueless for present
purposes since there is no reference to the point in the opinion itself.
937 Ohio App. 553, 175 N. E. 222 (1931), noted in 27 Ky. L. J. 102, 16 Minn. L.
Rev. 102.
10 Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N. W. 276 (1922). That
case and Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581 (1906), are clearly dis-
tinguishable on their facts.
11 Joy v. Jackson & Michigan Plank Road Co., 11 Mich. 155 (1863) ; Jesse v. Four
Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N. W. 277 (1922).
12 Benefit to the corporation flowing from the successful defense of a derivative
action by the director would be indirect at best. A note in 27 Ky. L. J. 102 sug-
gests that a benefit might accrue to the corporation in that the director would be
apt to extend himself to the best of his ability to serve the corporation after the
entity has accorded him just treatment by the payment of his legal expenses.
Something more tangible would seem to be necessary. In Godley v. Crandall &
Godley Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N. Y. S. 251 (1917), affirmed without opinion in
227 N. Y. 656, 126 N. E. 908 (1920), a suit to appoint a receiver for the corporation
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lize the divergence of legal opinion which encompasses the question here
discussed.
Perhaps the strongest expression of judicial authority supporting the
negative side of the question is the New York case of New York Dock
Company, Inc. v. McCollom,1 3 wherein the corporation sought a declaratory
judgment to the effect that it was not legally obligated to pay its directors
for the expense which they had incurred in the successful defense of a
derivative action.14 The court, deciding for the corporation, reasoned that
in the first place there was no implied contract which would entitle the
directors to recovery. In that connection, cases involving other fiduciaries
were rejected as being inapplicable to the situation of a director who was
said to be sui generis. Secondly, the court held there was no broad equitable
obligation to repay the directors, relying on the authority of the Griesse
case as well as on the proposition that liability to stockholders suits was a
risk attendant upon the acceptance of a directorship. 15 Lastly, it dismissed
the social argument, one to the effect that unless a right of reimbursement
was established men of ability would hesitate to accept directorships, on
the ground that the settled law of the state made it impossible to lend
it any weight.
On the other hand, the New Jersey case of Solimine v. Hollander'6
evolved a contrary result, permitting the judicially vindicated directors
to obtain reimbursement for their attorneys' fees. To achieve that result,
the court found it necessary to rationalize that derivative suits were not a
hazard assumed by directors but rather that it was the duty of directors
to defend against unjust charges in order that corporate guidance should
not be wrested from those in whom the stockholders had placed their
trust. For support, the court relied on a trust case which had decided that
the trust estate was liable for counsel fees incurred by a trustee who had
been successful in defending an action brought to remove him as trustee
for alleged mismanagement.' 7 That principle was held applicable to a
director for, while the court was careful not to denominate him a trustee,
was successfully resisted by the director. See also Esposito v. Riverside Sand &
Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185, 191 N. E. 363 (1934) ; Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General
Plastics, 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 415 (1939), affirmed without opinion in
280 N. Y. 840, 21 N. E. (2d) 887 (1939) ; and annotation in 152 A. L. R. 909 at
p. 922.
13 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 844 (1939), noted in 25 Corn. L. Q. 437.
14 It is to be noted that the presentation of the question in this form framed the
issue narrowly and made the director's task more difficult. See Washington, "Liti-
gation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits," 40 Col. L. Rev. 431
(1940), particularly pp. 442-3.
15 The court intimated that if the defense had been beneficial to the corporation
indemnification would have been appropriate.
16129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. (2d) 344 (1941), noted in 26 Minn. L. Rev. 119.
17 Jessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 (1918).
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it recognized a substantial similarity in the fiduciary attributes of each.
Although the court did not rest its decision on the "benefit" theory, it
considered that the successful defense of the derivative action by the
director had produced a benefit to the corporation by demonstrating the
honest purpose of the corporate management to the investing public.
Further reason for the holding was said to be found in the fact
that it would serve to induce men of high business acumen to accept
directorships.' 8
The basic difference between the McCollom and the Solimine cases
turns on the unwillingness of the former to accord to directors the same
fiduciary privileges as are applicable to trustees, executors, and receivers.
The right of each of these fiduciaries to reimbursement for counsel fees
expended in the successful resistance of suits brought to remove them for
alleged abuse of trust is well established. 19 It would seem as if the under-
lying principle which supports a right of repayment for these other
fiduciaries should be made applicable to directors even though, in other
respects, they are sui generis.20 Courts willing to look at the problem
in this light would find adequate basis from which to overcome the con-
tention that the defense of a derivative action is a risk attendant upon
the acceptance of a directorship.
Another difference concerns the argument that if a rule were estab-
lished which would deny reimbursement there would be few men of high
business caliber who would be willing to accept directorships. The policy
underlying this argument was curtly dismissed in the McCollom case, but
was strongly relied on in both the Solimine and the instant cases. Statutory
restrictions developed in recent years, together with the imposition of higher
standards, have made the director's position one extremely vulnerable to
suit although he usually continues to receive no more than nominal com-
pensation for the assumption of these added risks. 21 The equities, therefore,
18 An indirect product of this argument would be that directors of limited means
would be able to retain more competent, and presumably more costly, counsel than
might otherwise be the case if it was known that the financially abler corporation
would stand the expense of a successful defense.
19 As to trustees, see Jessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 (1918). The
rights of executors are considered in Pinckard's Distributees v. Pinckard's Adm'rs,
24 Ala. 250 (1854) ; In re Levinson's Estate, 108 Cal. 450, 41 P. 483 (1895) ; Arm-
strong v. Boyd, 140 Ga. 710, 79 S. E. 780 (1913) ; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 99 Mo. 427,
12 S. W. 457 (1889). See also Woerner, The American Law of Administration
(Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1899), 2d Ed., §§ 515-7. As to receivers, see
Missouri & K. I. Ry. Co. v. Edson, 224 F. 79 (1915). Public officials have not been
accorded this treatment but the holding may be reconciled on the ground that public
funds are concerned: Chapman v. City of New York, 168 N. Y. 80, 61 N. E. 108
(1901).
20 Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private Corporations (West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, 1949), 2d Ed., p. 647, and cases there cited, provides a discussion of the
legal characteristics of a director.
21 Washington, "Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders'
Suits," 40 Col. L. Rev. 431 (1940), at p. 432.
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support a claim for reimbursement but subject to two important limitations.
One is that there should be no indemnification unless the director has been
vindicated on the merits of the derivative action.2 2 The other is that none
of the corporate funds should be expended toward the personal defense
of the director during the course of the trial.23 Without these limitations,
the ability of stockholders to protect themselves from the acts of dishonest
directors would be seriously impaired.
The force of the New York decision in the McCollom case may also
be said to be shaken by legislative action which has been taken in that
state, action designed not only to shut off the frequency of "strike" suits
by minority stockholders but also to insure indemnification for the vindi-
cated and diligent director.24 If there should be fear that other courts,
when first faced with the problem, would be inclined to follow a tradi-
tional, rather than a liberal approach, the answer would seem to lie in the
enactment elsewhere of similar legislation.
A. S. GRENE
GRAND JURY-ATTENDANCE AND EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES-WHETHER
OR NoT A REIFUSAL TO ANSWER SEvERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SAME
SUBJECT MATTER WARRANTS PUNrSHMENT AS FOR SEVERAL CONTEP'rS-
Frequent reiteration, by witnesses who have recently appeared before vari-
ous congressional committees, of the stock answer "I refuse to answer on
constitutional grounds," has tended to make the remark somewhat of a
colloquialism but it has also produced a number of legal problems.' One
such problem arose in a New York habeas corpus proceeding entitled
People ex rel. Anarante v. McDonnell.2 The relator there, on interrogation
before a grand jury, had been asked seven questions, each of which was
designed to ascertain whether or not he owned or managed a store wherein
forms of gambling had been found to flourish. For refusal to answer any
one of the questions, the relator was taken before an appropriate court
and was sentenced to the maximum fine and term of imprisonment war-
ranted for seven criminal contempts. On petition for habeas corpus chal-
22 Wood v. Noma Electric Corp., N. Y. L. J. Oct. 10, 1936, p. 1121, col. 7, and
Washington, "Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits,"
40 Col. L. Rev. 431 (1940), at p. 540. It has been held that not only must the
defense be as to the merits of the claim but it must also be successful: Wither-
spoon v. Hornbeing, 70 Colo. 1, 196 P. 865 (1921) ; Monahan v. Kenny, 248 App.
Div. 159, 288 N. Y. S. 323 (1936).
23 Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. (2d) 344 (1941).
24 Cahill's Cons. Laws N. Y., Dec. Supp. 1938-48, Vol. 1, Gen. Corporation Law,
Art. 6A, § 63.
1 A general symposium on the subject of congressional investigations appears in
18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 421-661 (1951).
2 - Misc. -, 100 N. Y. S. (2d) 463 (1950).
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lenging the validity of that judgment, it was held that the relator could
be punished for but one criminal contempt as the questions concerned the
same subject matter and were designed to elicit but one answer.
Before considering the problem presented, it might be well to eliminate
certain other aspects of the general subject which might produce confusion.
If a man is to be punished for one contempt while refusing to answer
questions concerning the same subject matter, it might be thought that,
being punished once, he could not again be punished for again refusing
to answer the same questions. Such, however, is not the law for the rule
as to double jeopardy is inapplicable because each separate occasion is
treated as a separate contumacious act.8 Similarly, a single trial for several
separate and distinct contemptuous acts4 could well result in several
individual sentences. Acts which have been treated as amounting to sepa-
rate acts of contempt, however, have usually been characterized by a
separation in point of time,5 have constituted successive violations of an
injunction,6 or have represented distinct affronts to the character and
dignity of the judge and the court.
7
With this much distinction, the problem herein involved can be placed
in focus. While there is a paucity of cases on the subject, the outcome and
language of those which have been discovered appears to be identical in
nature. In four cases8 beside the principal case, it was found to be proper
to impose punishment for but one contempt for, in each case, the questions
asked were devised so as to elicit the same general information. Final
evidence of homogeneity in the cases in this group is to be found in the
likeness of the phrases which were used to characterize the similarity of
the content of the questions. The principal case and one other 9 speak of
3 State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 200, 224 N. W. 838 (1929).
4 Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 186 S. W. (2d) 225, 160 A. L. R. 1099 (1945).
5 Solano Aquatic Club v. Superior Court of Solano County, 165 Cal. 278, 131 P.
874 (1913) ; In re Clark, 126 Mo. App. 391, 103 S. W. 1105 (1905).
6 Golden Gate Consol. Hydraulic Min. Co. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 187, 3 P. 628
(1884) ; People ex rel. Post v. Grant, 13 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 305 (1888), reversed on
other grounds in 50 Hun. 243, 3 N. Y. S. 142 (1888) ; Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex.
476, 186 S. W. (2d) 225, 160 A. L. R. 1099 (1945).
7 Hume v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. (2d) 506, 110 P. (2d) 669 (1941) ; Ex parte
Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 P. 481 (1930) ; Lindley v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 419,
245 P. 212 (1926).
8 United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (1951) ; United States v. Yukio Abe,
95 F. Supp. 991 (1950) ; Maxwell v. Rives, 11 Nev. 213 (1876) ; Fawick Airflex Co.
v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N. E. (2d) 431 (1950).
While the aforementioned cases discuss the problem of single as against multiple
punishment, it is to be noted that in People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill. 202, 181 N. E. 617
(1932), and in People v. Finkel, 157 Misc. 781, 284 N. Y. S. 725 (1935), evasive
answers were given to a number of questions but, without comment, the court
invoked punishment for but one contempt.
9 Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 87 Ohio App. 371 at 388,
92 N. E. (2d) 431 at 436 (1950). The subject matter of the questions asked con-
cerned whether or not the witness was, or ever had been, affiliated with the
Communist Party.
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the "same subject matter"; another uses the phrase "one subject of
inquiry" ;1o still another speaks of the questions as all concerning "the
same issue";11 while the remaining case approves the last mentioned
phrase.
12
While the correctness of these decisions is not to be questioned, at
least from the point of view of any injustice to the individual, it should
be observed that the qualifying words mentioned could lead to a position
which might unfairly impinge upon the liberty of the individual. This
follows for the result of such language would point to an opposite rule
which would, if the interrogator was able to present a line of questioning
that covered more than one subject matter, expose the individual to a
separate punishment for contempt for every refusal which covered a
different issue.13 To such a rule, some practical objections could be enter-
tained. In the first place, there would be no certainty as to the maximum
punishment to which an individual would be subject, for the judge, at the
time for determining the extent of the punishment, would have to search
the record and make distinctions, difficult to make objectively, as to when
one line of questioning had been abandoned and a new line taken up.
Secondly, if the punishment is to be invoked because of the objectionable
attitude displayed by the individual, what difference should it make
whether his refusals pertain to one or to different subject matters? In the
end, he has only one and the same contumacious attitude justifying but
one punishment for contempt.
14
There is still another objection to such a rule, but one less likely to
arise over an investigation conducted by a court or a grand jury, where
specific issues may be the more readily formulated, than is true with
respect to inquisitorial proceedings conducted by legislative committees
where there is opportunity to embark upon a line of questioning covering
10 This phrase, as used in United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 at 992
(1950), again concerned questions as to membership in the Communist Party. The
proceeding was based on 2 U. S. C. A. § 192, each refusal being set out in a separate
count. On motion to dismiss, the court held that it was proper to put each refusal
in a separate count but, as the refusals concerned one subject of inquiry, proper
punishment was said to be limited to that for one contumacious refusal.
11 Maxwell v. Rives, 11 Nev. 213 at 217 (1876). Hawley, C. J., in a concurring
opinion, characterized the fact that all the questions were designed to ascertain
what the witness had done with certain silver bullion.
12 In United States v. Emspak, 95 P. Supp. 1012 (1951), a proceeding similar to
the one cited in footnote 10, the court recognized that inasmuch as all the questions
were designed to ascertain whether the witness was a member of the Communist
Party they necessarily concerned the same issue.
13 It would theoretically be possible for an ambitious interrogator, by a suitable
variation of his questions, to produce a result under which the contemptuous wit-
ness might be imprisoned for the balance of his life, particularly if the sentences
were made to run consecutively.
14 State ex rel. Parker v. Mouser, 208 La. 1093, 24 So. (2d) 151 (1945). O'Niell,
C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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a multitude of subject matters. A basic fear of all forms of inquisitions
has produced a pattern of constitutional protection designed to cloak the
individual with certain rights which have operated to produce a fence
around the scope of these inquisitorial proceedings. 15 The implications
suggested by the rule laid down in the instant case might well operate to
whittle away at that protection.
With this in mind, it may be noted that three of the recent cases
mentioned had to do with the asking of a series of questions designed to
elicit the fact as to whether or not the witness was a member of the
Communist Party.16 Apparently, under the impetus of such investigations,
sight is being lost of the objectives of a democratic form of government.
If the rule laid down in these cases is observed, a position will be attained
consistent with a fundamental desire to preserve that carefully guarded
balance which, at a minimum, puts the witness on an equal footing with
the questioner. If this balance be upset, as the intimations indicate it
might be, the result would be to place an additional weapon at the dis-
position of the inquisitor. That weapon, taking the form of a lever of
coercion based on a threat of the possibility of being asked numerous
questions covering many issues with a consequence of not one but many
punishments for refusal to answer, might well intimidate all but the
staunchest of witnesses. 17 Such a result would hardly conform to long
recognized and fundamental concepts of government under a free society.
While the correctness of the result of the principal case is not chal-
lenged, it would seem that the inherent reasoning thereof is poor. Truer
reason for the result would appear to lie in the fact that the refusal to
answer one or many, related or unrelated, questions asked at one proceed-
ing should warrant punishment for but a single contempt because of the
singleness of the attitude displayed rather than because of any similarity
in the line of interrogation.
D. R. HANSON
15 U. S. Const., Amend. V, states that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." It reflects the reality of a fear on
the part of its framers and supporters against the former inquisitorial nature of
British criminal proceedings. The protection thereof, of course, is not limited to
judicial matters.
16 United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (1951) ; United States v. Yukio Abe,
95 F. Supp. 991 (1950) ; Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs.,
87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N. E. (2d) 431 (1950).
17 While it is admitted that a witness has a right to refuse to answer those
questions which might tend to incriminate him, it must be recognized that he may
wish to refuse to answer other questions because his answers might do injury to
his reputation or to his financial position. If a refusal to answer the significant
question is apt to expose him to lines of further questioning as to other matters, he
may yield to the pressure so generated to avoid the dilemma of chosing between
self-disgrace or self-injury on the one hand and the overly-weighted penalty of
punishment for a series of contempts on the other.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACTIONS BY THIRD PERSONS AGAINST
EM.PLOYER-WHETHER EMPLOYER WHOSE INSURANCE CARRIER HAS PAID
COMPENSATION CLAIM UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT MAY BE REQUIRED TO MAKE CONTRIBUTION TO OR
INDEMNIFY A THIRD PARTY-The case of Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany v. Vallendingham' discloses an interesting interpretation which has
been given to Section 905 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.2 It appeared therein that an employee of an employer
who was subject to the Act had been injured in the course of his employ-
ment and had elected to accept the compensation benefits there provided.
Plaintiff, insurance carrier for the employer, by appropriate subrogation
proceedings under the Act,3 brought suit against certain defendants charg-
ing that their negligence had contributed to the employee's injury. These
defendants thereupon impleaded the employer as a third-party defendant,
4
claiming that the employer's contributory negligence was a proximate
concurring cause of the employee's injury and seeking contribution from
the employer. 5 The plaintiff moved to dismiss the third-party complaint
and that motion was granted on the ground that Section 905 of the Act
released the employer from liability to "anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer" on account of an injury or death,
for which reason it was not possible to hold the employer to contribution
based on the contention that the employer was a joint tort feasor. In that
fashion, the court guaranteed to the employer the protection which had
been sought by transferring the risk to an insurer.
The question raised in the principal case has to do with the right of
contribution from an employer who has made provision for the payment
of compensation benefits under the Act, but an identical problem could
well arise where the third party seeks indemnification from an employer
1 94 F. Supp. 17 (1950). The case arose in the District of Columbia which has
adopted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as the general
workmen's compensation act for the District: D. C. Code 1940, § 36-501.
2 33 U. S. C. A. § 901 et seq. Section 905 provides, in part, that the liability "of
an employer prescribed in Section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place
of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such
injury or death." Italics added.
3 Ibid., § 933(b), provides that acceptance of compensation shall operate as an
assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to
recover damages against a third person. Section 933(i) directs that if an employer
is insured and the insurance carrier has assumed the payment of compensation, the
insurance carrier is to be subrogated to all the rights of the employer under this
section. See also The Etna, 138 F. (2d) 37 (1943).
4 Third-party practice is authorized by Fed. Rules Civ. Prac., Rule 14.
5 The District of Columbia, contrary to common law principles, recognizes a right
of contribution between joint tort feasors.
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subject to the Act. While many of the reported cases draw no distinction
between the two situations, they will be treated separately in this discussion
for reasons to be indicated later.
The instant case, adopting a practical view to prevent defeat of the
purpose of the statute, states that no right of contribution exists in such
cases. But this has not always appeared to be so for the progress of
reasoning has been an uphill one largely because of dicta appearing in
certain admiralty cases where the question of contribution or indemnity
was not squarely before the court.6 Those cases have tended to indicate,
in a general way, that a right to contribution or indemnity from an
employer who is subject to the Act exists because admiralty law, unlike
common law, recognizes a right of contribution between joint tort feasors.
7
Such dicta was followed in the case of The Tarnpico,8 an admiralty case
directly in point with the principal one but one which reached an entirely
contrary holding. The employer there was impleaded in accordance with
certain provisions of admiralty practice9 and judgment was pronounced
against the libellee together with a provision that the libellee might have
contribution from the employer for one-half of the amount of the judg-
ment. It was there stated that the admiralty rule of contribution between
joint tort feasors did not rest on subrogation but arose directly from the
tort, for which reason the immunity given by the Act to the employer
furnished no defense against the libellee's claim to contribution. 10 It should
be noted, however, that the decision was based on an admiralty rule and
that little thought was there given to the practical aspects of the statute
itself. That an employer, bound by the Act to an employer's limited but
inevitable liability, should exchange that limited liability for an uncondi-
tional and unlimited one is not within reason. Accordingly, remedies against
6 Cases frequently cited as authority for the proposition that, notwithstanding
Section 905 of the Act, an employer may be liable for contribution or indemnity to
a third party sued by an employee of the employer are Rederii v. Jarka Corp.,
26 F. Supp. 304 (1939), affirmed in 110 F. (2d) 234 (1940) ; Calvino v. Pan-Atlantic
S. S. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 1022 (1939), noted in 168 A. L. R. 612; and Cataldo v. A/S
Glittre, 41 F. Supp. 555 (1941). These cases contain only dicta on the point.
7 See Erie R. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U. S. 220, 27 S. Ct. 246, 51 L. Ed.
450 (1907).
8 45 F. Supp. 174 (1942).
9 28 U. S. C. A., Adm. Rule 56.
10 The view so expressed has been followed in Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 89 F.
Supp. 765 (1950); Portal v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (1949); The S. S.
Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (1947), citing dicta in the Rederii and Cataldo cases; and
Christon v. United States, 8 F. R. D. 327 (1947), which cited American Stevedores
v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 67 S. Ct. 847, 91 L. Ed. 1011 (1947). That case was
decided on the basis of contractual indemnity. Upon remand, in Porello v. United
States, 94 F. Supp. 952 (1950), the validity of the contract requiring indemnity
from the employer to the United States was upheld.
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the employer under circumstances of the type involved in the principal
case should be strictly limited."
The practical view suggested finally prevailed in the case of Johnson
v. United States,12 also an admiralty case, wherein the exclusiveness of
remedy against the employer was first treated with the thought in mind
that to hold an employer for contribution would be contrary to the
manifest purpose of the Act. The court there indicated that to hold that
an employer, bound by a compulsory compensation act, could be sued
indirectly, as was there proposed, would be "like opening a hole in a
dike, '"1 s and would destroy the basic principle of compensation. The
doctrine of that case now seems firmly imbedded in the law and the logic
thereof would be hard to attack. The Act, by preventing recovery by an
employee against his employer on the ground of the employer's negligence,
operates to make the statutory obligation of the employer to pay compen-
sation into an exclusive one. If the statute was to be construed to preserve
the employer's liability for the payment of a sum measured, in whole or
in part, by the damages sustained by the employee, merely because the
negligence of a third party concurred, or was claimed to have concurred,
with his own in producing the injury, the employer's liability would then
be lacking in exclusiveness. For that reason, it was said, in the case of
Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals
Corporation,14 that it was immaterial whether his liability to a joint tort
feasor stemmed from "a statutory right to contribution or from general
principles of the admiralty law."' 5 It is clear, then, that where an employer
is subject to the terms of the Act there is no common liability between
him and a third party, for the former responds by paying compensation,
often without regard to fault, while the other is muleted in damages based
only on fault.16
In holding to this practical view, the instant case speaks of "proximate
concurring cause" and "joint tort feasors" as if the right invaded or the
duty owed was common to both employer and third person. It does not
deal with a possible right to indemnity which a third party may have
against an employer where the employer's negligence is alleged to be the
sole and proximate cause of the injuries or where it is alleged that a right
to indemnity exists because of an independent duty owed by the employer
to the third party. A typical case which might give rise to a claim for
11 See a discussion of this view in a concurring opinion by Justice Learned Hand
in American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. (2d) 322 (1950).
12 79 F. Supp. 448 (1948).
13 79 F. Supp. 448 at 449.
14 - Md. -, 65 A. (2d) 304 (1949).
15- Md. - at -, 65 A. (2d) 304 at 308.
16 American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. (2d) 322 (1950).
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indemnity would be one where a longshoreman firm contracts with a
shipowner to load a vessel or to do some maintenance work thereon. After
the injured longshoreman, having elected to proceed against the third
person, has recovered from the shipowner, the latter may look for indemnity
from the injured employee's primary employer. In some instances, the
contract between the firm and the shipowner may expressly provide for a
right of indemnity. If so, it has been said to be axiomatic that the exclusive
character of the worker's remedy against his primary employer would
afford no protection to one who has seen fit to waive the protection.'
7
In other cases, however, the contract may be silent on. the point and a
question would then be generated closely analogous to the one found in
the instant case.
There is no clear cut decision which holds that no right of indemnity
from an employer exists where the third party has been sued directly and
the contract is silent, but there might seem to be every reason to expect
an opposite holding. Such a right to indemnity might be said to arise from
the breach of an independent duty owed by the employer to the third
party as, for example, a duty to do the work contracted for in a proper
manner. There. is, therefore, strong authority that the breach of such an
independent duty will afford the third party with a remedy, as by way
of indemnification, against the employer notwithstanding the exclusive-
ness of the Act as it relates to claims by employees against employers. s
A manifest difference does exist, however, between suits for contribution
and suits for indemnity in that the latter rest on an expressed or implied
agreement or obligation to respond for all the damages, whereas, under
the former, a common burden is to be shared by persons who stand in
equali juri.19 That factor alone may serve as justification for the diversity
in the holdings.
Looking to the remedy sought, however, the conclusion is inescapable
that if a third party is entitled to seek indemnity from an employer
because of some breach of duty resting in negligence, the employer is then
being asked to respond in damages in an indirect way for something for
17 American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 67 S. Ct. 847, 91 L. Ed. 1011
(1947), followed in Porello v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 952 (1950). See also
Lyons v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 89 F. Supp. 334 (1950) ; Severn v. United
States, 69 F. Supp. 21 (1946) ; Benevento v. United States, 68 P. Supp. 347 (1946),
affirmed on other grounds In 160 F. (2d) 487 (1947) ; Green v. War Shipping Ad-
ministration, 66 F. Supp. 393 (1946).
Is Rich v. United States, 177 F. (2d) 688 (1949), citing with approval from
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N. Y. 175,
15 N. E. (2d) 567 (1938) ; Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F. (2d) 218 (1941).
New York cases are frequently cited by the federal courts on this problem in
recognition of the fact that the federal statute is modelled on the New York
Workmen's Compensation Law: Coates v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 95 F. Supp.
779 (1951).
19 Barbara v. Stephen Ransom, Inc., 191 Misc. 957, 79 N. Y. S. (2d) 438 (1948).
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which he could not be held to make direct response. If, by an impleading
petition,20 the third party is entitled to seek indemnity from the employer
in the event he should be found liable to the injured employee, no practical
reason would seem to exist for barring direct suit by employee against
employer. As it is now clear that if the injury complained of is the sole
fault of the employer the only available remedy to the employee is under
the Act itself, 21 reasoning of this nature brings the ends of the arc of
contribution and indemnity together at a point where direct opposition
rather than harmony results. If resolution of that conflict is to be pro-
duced, it would seem as if the only way out would be the universal
adoption of one view or the other. The instant holding, with its emphasis
on the exclusive character of the employer's liability, may well become
the starting point for a re-examination of the entire problem.
T. L. SPALDING
20 Of necessity, the attempt would have to be made in a court where third-party
practice prevails. As to whether such is possible in a state court sitting in Illinois,
see 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 33 and 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RE Mvw 46-7.
21 Frusteri v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 667 (1947) ; Armento v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 198 (1947) ; Paolillo v. Redari A/B Disa, 38 F. Supp. 833 (1941).
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APPEAL AND ERROR--DECISIONS REVIEWABLE-WHETHER ORDER Dis-
MISSING Surr, ENTERED AT REQUEST OF PLAINTIFF AFTER MOTION TO STRIKE
mIS COMPLAINT HAS BEEN SUSTAINED, IS AN APPEALABLE ORDER AT INSTANCE
OF THE PLAINTr ---After a motion to quash service,' to strike a com-
plaint,2 or to deny a request for a new trial3 has been granted, it does
not follow that the disappointed litigant is thereupon free to appeal
from the adverse ruling for the cause would still stand without the neces-
sary "final judgment, order or decree" essential to support proceedings
on appeal. 4 The successful party could, of course, follow up his motion
with a further request to the court to dismiss the suit. If he does not, the
holding in McDavid v. Fiscar5 would indicate that the unsuccessful party,
wishing to stand on his record without waiving any error that may have
been committed, is entitled to apply for the entry of a final judgment
without becoming involved in a possible claim that the judgment, because
entered by consent, lacks the quality of an appealable order.6 In that case,
plaintiff's complaint to recover, as administrator, for the wrongful death
of his decedent had been stricken in the trial court on motion for failure
to state a cause of action since it showed that the only heir at law was an
adopted child of the decedent. 7 Neither the defendant nor the court took
any further actions so the plaintiff, to protect a right to appeal, moved
the court to enter judgment against him and judgment was so entered.
The Appellate Court for the Third District, refusing to dismiss the appeal
which followed upon that action, said it would be "too narrow and tech-
1 Brauer Machine & Supply Company v. Parkhill Truck Company, 383 Ill. 569,
50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvmw 207.
2 Gould v. Klabunde, 326 Ill. App. 643, 63 N. E. (2d) 258 (1945).
3 Anderson v. Samuelson, 340 Ill. App. 528, 92 N. E. (2d) 343 (1950), noted in
29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 59-60.
4 IR. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201.
5 342 Ill. App. 673, 97 N. E. (2d) 587 (1951).
6 Nelson v. Nelson, 340 Ill. App. 463, 92 N. E. (2d) 534 (1940), noted in 29
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvrpw 58-9, illustrates the effect to be given, on motion to
dismiss an appeal, to an "approved" decree entered by consent of parties.
7 In that regard, the court found that the phrase "next of kin," as used in Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, was not limited to blood relatives of the decedent
but encompassed all those who would, by the laws of descent, fall within the class
of "heirs at law" as defined by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 162, hence per-
mitted suit for the benefit of the adopted child. The result achieved was obtained
by analogy from the holding in Security Title & Trust Co. v. West Chicago St.
R. R. Co., 91 Ill. App. 332 (1900), permitting recovery in a wrongful death case by
the mother of an illegitimate child, and in Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Baddeley, 150 Ill. 328, 36 N. E. 965 (1894), allowing recovery for the benefit of a
surviving husband, neither of whom would have been classed as "next of kin"
according to the common law.
8 The judge would have inherent power to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
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nical a construction of the rules of law and procedure" to treat such a
judgment as being one entered by consent. An undesirable over-liberality
on the part of reviewing courts, straining to sustain the right to appeal,
previously noticed, 9 may now become unnecessary if the unsuccessful party
will remember to make a suitable motion to secure an unquestionable final
order in the case.
APPEARANCE-WITHDRAWAL--WHETHER OR NOT A GENERAL APPEAR-
ANCE MAY BE WITHDRAWN, APTER DELAY GRANTED AT DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST, AND A SPECIAL APPEARANCE BE ENTERED-The defendant in
Athens v. Ernst,' after entering a general appearance, obtained several
extensions of time within which to plead to the complaint. Seven months
later, the defendant filed a petition praying leave to withdraw the general
appearance and praying that he be given leave to substitute a special
appearance. He also sought leave to file a motion to quash the service and
to dismiss the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exercise
that degree of diligence in obtaining service required by Rule 5 of the
Illinois Supreme Court. 2 It appeared that the plaintiff had sued to recover
damages for personal injuries as well as property damage resulting from
a boiler explosion in premises owned by the defendant and leased to the
plaintiff. Summons was returned by the sheriff as "not found," as was
also true of an alias summons. Some five years later, a pluries summons
was issued and, according to the return, was personally served. Following
service and general appearance, the attorney for the defendant obtained
several extensions of time upon the ground that there was a question as
to whether the defendant's insurance carrier would accept or decline
responsibility. Thereafter, and upon proceedings taken as above indicated,
the trial court granted defendant's several motions and dismissed the cause
for want of prosecution. The Appellate Court for the First District, on
appeal by plaintiff, reversed the decision on the ground that advantage
had to be taken of formal defects and irregularities in process or service
at the first opportunity, and before any other step had been taken in the
cause, otherwise the same would be deemed cured. 3
It is quite apparent that courts possess inherent power, in the interest
of the efficient administration of justice, to dismiss suits for want of
prosecution, 4 and it would appear that the plaintiff had been guilty of a
9 See note in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvrEw 207, particularly p. 208.
1342 Ill. App. 357, 96 N. E. (2d) 643 (1950).
2Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §259.5(2), provides that: "Where the
plaintiff fails to show reasonable diligence to obtain service through the issuance of
alias writs, the action may be dismissed on the application of any defendant or on
the court's own motion."
3 42 Am. Jur., Process, p. 101, § 116.
4 See O'Dea v. Throm, 332 Ill. 89, 163 N. E. 390 (1929).
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want of diligence in the prosecution of the cause.5 The law is also well
settled that the entry of a general appearance is to be treated as a waiver
of irregularities with respect to process and service, particularly where
the defendant has obtained an extension of time or has taken some other
step inconsistent with a special appearance. 6 The instant case, however,
would seem to be one in which, for the first time, an Illinois court of
review has been called upon to decide the precise question involved.7 The
court did not condone plaintiff's lack of diligence but did think that it
would be unjust to permit the defendant to have the advantage of a
general appearance and then, months later, be able to question the juris-
diction of the court. Keeping in mind the fact that it is the spirit of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act that controversies should be speedily and finally
determined according to the substantive, rather than the technical, rights
of the parties,8 the decision achieved in the instant case would seem to
be sound.
AUTOMOBILES--INJURIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAY-
WHETHER STATUTORY AMENDMENT AUTHORIZING SUBST1rUTED SERVICE OF
PROCESS ON RESIDENT MOTORIST WHO DEPARTS FROM STATE POSSESSES
RETROACTIVE EFPECT-A serious defect existing in the Illinois statute
relating to substituted service on motorists in connection with suits growing
out of accidents arising from the use of the highways of the state' was
corrected by an amendment thereto enacted in 1949.2 As amended, the
statute was made applicable not simply to non-resident motorists, as had
previously been the case, but also to residents who, subsequent to the
events giving rise to the cause of action, became non-residents. 3 The earlier
case of Glineberg v. Evans4 had indicated that service upon a resident
5 The motion to dismiss recited that the defendant had, at all times between the
commencement of the action and the service of the pluries summons, been openly
and notoriously a resident of the county.
6 See People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157, 103 A. L. R.
1229 (1936).
7 The opinion cites only the case of Raymondville Paper Co. v. St. Gabriel Lumber
Co., Ltd., 140 F. 965 (1905), to the point. The defendant there had appeared gen-
erally and considerable time was spent in negotiations regarding a settlement. Four
months later, the defendant raised the question of want of authority of its attorney
to file a general appearance. The court held that the application for leave to file a
special appearance came too late.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 128.
1 See comment on the case of Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d)
525 (1947), appearing in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 159-62.
2 Laws 1949, p. 1134, 1l. B. 235; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 951, § 23.
3 Technical objection to the application of the statute, prior to amendment, had
also been voiced in Rompza v. Lucas, 337 IIl. App. 106, 85 N. E. (2d) 467 (1949),
noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 249.
4 341 Ill. App. 332, 93 N. E. (2d) 520 (1950), abst. opin.
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motorist, by leaving a copy of the process with a member of his family,
was permissible prior to the time such resident had effectively established
a domicile elsewhere.5 The recent case of Sanders v. Paddock,6 however,
discloses that the amendment in question may not be given retroactive
effect. In that case, a defendant who had been a resident of the state at
the time of a highway collision, but who had, prior to suit and attempted
service, become an unquestioned resident of another state, was successful
in his challenge directed against a purported service had on the Secretary
of State as his supposed agent when it appeared that the accident had
occurred prior to the passage of the 1949 amendment to the state statute,
although service was not attempted until after that date. The Appellate
Court for the Third District indicated that it would be "illogical to
conclude that an Illinois motorist could conclusively appoint . . . an attor-
ney by action of law, at a time when no such law was in existence.'
' 7
Since the appointment of a statutory agent goes to the essence of the
statutory scheme, and is not merely a procedural question," the refusal to
give retroactive application to the change in the statute would seem proper.9
DAMAGES-GROUNDS AND SUBJECTS OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGE-
WHETHER OR NOT PAYMENT FOR A COVENANT NOT TO SUE, MADE BY ONE
AGAINST WHOM TORT LIABILITY WOULD LIE, MAY BE USED TO MITIGATE
DAMAGE IN SUIT AGAINST ANOTHER WHOSE TORT LIABILITY ARISES FROM
THE SAME CmcuMSTANcEs-In the recent case of New York, Chicago &
St. Louis Railroad Company v. Americam Transit Lines, Inc.,' plaintiff
sought damages for the destruction of freight cars wrecked when a motor
truck operated by the defendant collided with a railroad train. Among
other issues, the trial court was asked to decide whether a deduction should
be made, from the amount of the verdict for plaintiff, of a sum equal to
5 The headnote in that case would indicate that the defendant had left Illinois,
and was en route to California by automobile, two days before the process server
arrived at what had been his "usual place of abode" within the meaning of Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 137.
6 342 Ill. App. 701, 97 N. E. (2d) 600 (1951).
7 342 Ill. App. 701 at 705, 97 N. E. (2d) 600 at 602.
8 A change in the manner of conveying notice to the non-resident motorist was
held to be no more than a procedural change in Duggan v. Ogden, 278 Mass. 432,
180 N. E. 301, 82 A. L. R. 765 (1932), hence could be given retroactive effect. See
discussion in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 347-54 as to the effect to be given to a
statute authorizing suit against the non-resident administrator of a deceased non-
resident motorist's estate.
9 See Hartley v. Utah Construction Co., 106 F. (2d) 953 (1939) ; Paraboschi v.
Shaw, 258 Mass. 531, 155 N. E. 445 (1927) ; Ashley v. Brown, 198 N. C. 369, 151 S. E.
725 (1930); Schaeffer v. Alva West & Co., 53 Ohio App. 270, 4 N. E. (2d) 720
(1936) ; Kurland v. Chernobil, 260 N. Y. 254, 183 N. E. 380 (1932).
1408 Ill. 338, 97 N. E. (2d) 264 (1951), in part reversing 339 Ill. App. 282,
89 N. E. (2d) 858 (1949). The cause for reversal pertained to matter not here
important.
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that received by the plaintiff for executing a covenant not to sue in favor
of another joint tort feasor who had been involved in the same harm.
Because the trial court ruled favorably on defendant's motion to deduct
such sum, plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court for the Third District,
which affirmed. The Supreme Court, on leave to appeal, also held that such
payments could be used in mitigation of damages, although it reversed and
remanded the cause for other reasons.
The decision of the Appellate Court for the Second District in
Aldridge v. Morris2 seems to have initiated a movement to permit such
mitigation, although the question of the effect of such a covenant was not
directly before the court for it found that the plaintiff there concerned
actually had no right of recovery whatsoever. Without a right of recovery,
of course, there could never be an assessment of damages against a defen-
dant from which deduction could be made of money paid to a plaintiff
for such a covenant. The issue was squarely raised in Curtis v. City of
Chicago,3 however, and the Appellate Court for the First District approved
and applied the reasoning of the Aldridge case. The possibility of a
conflict in decision in one of the other appellate districts has now been
removed by the Supreme Court holding in the instant case, for that
court not only examined the Aldridge case view on the subject but also
noted its approval thereof by stating that the rule therein had been
properly applied to the situation before it.
INFANTS-AcTIONS--WHETHER OR NOT MINOR, UNABLE TO RETURN
BENEFITS RECEIVED, RATIFIES HIS DEED BY FAILURE TO TAKE AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION TO REPUDIATE WITHIN SEVEN MONTHS AFTER ATTAINING MAJORITY-
In the recent case of Shepherd v. Shepherd,1 the plaintiff, when seventeen
years of age, joined with an older brother in a conveyance of a life
estate to their mother, without consideration, reserving a remainder in
the property to themselves. Plaintiff joined the military service at eighteen,
received his discharge in January, 1946, while still a minor, and returned
to the farm with his wife and child, working for his mother as a salaried
employee until June of that year. He attained his majority on May 2, 1946.
Late in June, 1946, plaintiff moved to Chicago with the intention of attend-
ing a trade school. About this time, the older brother died testate leaving
a will devising a life estate in his portion of the property to his wife with
a remainder to plaintiff's minor son. In December, 1946, plaintiff began
a suit to cancel the deed, naming his mother and his sister-in-law as
2 337 Il. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), discussed in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 313.
3 339 Ii. App. 61, 89 N. E. (2d) 63 (1949).
1408 I1. 364, 97 N. E. (2d) 273 (1951).
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defendants. The chancellor denied relief so the plaintiff appealed directly
to the Supreme Court, a freehold being involved. That court affirmed the
decree on the ground the plaintiff had ratified the deed given during
minority by failure to repudiate promptly on becoming of age. 2
It is unquestionably the law that a deed executed by a minor is not
void but voidable only, so the transaction can become valid and effective
if ratified by the grantor after he attains his majority.3 It has also been
held in Illinois that a minor, after becoming of age, has no more than a
reasonable time in which to disaffirm, subject always to the requirement
that he refrain from any distinct or decisive act in the meantime evidencing
an intention to affirm his deed, for if he has, by conduct, ratified the deed
he cannot, thereafter, avoid it.4 The thing which makes the instant case
noteworthy is (1) the shortness of the period of time intervening between
the coming of age and the suit to disaffirm, and (2) the character of the
acts regarded as being decisive. The court seems to have placed reliance
on the fact that (1) plaintiff acquiesced in the grantee's control of the
land and even worked for his mother after reaching his majority; (2) that
he suggested that she rent the farm to a tenant; and (3) that plaintiff's
older brother had made a will and had died before plaintiff had disaffirmed,
thereby irrevocably fixing the nature of the interest of certain of the
parties concerned. As the opinion does not fix the exact date when plaintiff
suggested the renting of the farm, other than to say the suggestion was
made in the spring of 1946, it is possible the remark may have been made
before the plaintiff attained his majority. If so, such fact should have no
force in the decision.5 It is equally unsound to impute the conduct of the
older brother, in making the will he did, to plaintiff as being a distinct
and decisive act of the latter. True, estoppel could operate to prevent
2 The nature of the holding is revealed more sharply by the following quotation
from the opinion: "When Robert [plaintiff] attained his majority, his mother was
in the exclusive possession and control of the farm and Robert was in her employ.
This was the setting when Charles Shepherd, on June 21, 1946, made his will,
devising his interest in the farm to his wife for life, with the remainder to Robert's
young son. The evidence warrants the conclusion that this disposition of Charles's
interest in the farm was made in the belief that the family settlement would remain
undisturbed and that his mother had the right to stay on and operate the farm so
long as she lived ... Robert recognized and acquiesced in her control and manage-
ment of the land and ratified her action by working as her employee on the farm
after Mayl 2, 1946, his twenty-first birthday... [Robert] did not disaffirm within a
reasonable time, considering the facts and circumstances described, particularly
when the evidence discloses that he suggested to, his mother she rent the property
to a tenant.... ." 408 Ill. 364 at 378-9-81, 97 N. E. (2d) 273 at 280-1-2. Italics added
to emphasize what might be considered to be the only evidence of an implied
ratification on plaintiff's part.
3 Schlig v. Spear, 345 Ill. 219, 177 N. E. 730 (1931).
4 Rubin v. Strandberg, 288 Ill. 64, 122 N. E. 808 (1919).
5 Mandell v. Passaic National Bank and Trust Co., 18 N. J. Misc. 455, 14 A. (2d)
523 (1940).
RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
disaffirmance, 6 but there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the
plaintiff induced the making of the will or even knew its terms prior to
his brother's death. Nor did he accept any personal benefit under the will,
for the testator devised his interest to plaintiff's minor child. There is,
then, only one other fact left, to-wit: plaintiff worked for his mother for a
period of less than two months after becoming of age. Can it be said
that this was a distinct and decisive act enough to show an intention to
ratify the deed? As he had been working for his mother for some four
months while still a minor, it would be irrational, if not downright unfilial,
to expect him to quit on the day he became of age, during a period of
heavy farm work.
After the removal of these elements, the case boils down to one in
which the minor failed to repudiate his deed until seven months after
having attained his majority. The legislature has indicated its belief that
a minor who has been harmed during his minority should have at least
two years after becoming of age in which to maintain any suit,7 such
period being deemed a "reasonable" time within which to learn of, and
to assert, his cause of action. Should not the court have been at least
as liberal in making allowance for the immaturity of youth, particularly
when those who should have given counsel were the ones most likely to
withhold advice?
6 Lewis v. Van Cleve, 302 Ill. 413, 134 N. E. 804 (1922).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 22.
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SOME PROBLEMS Op EQUITY. Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University of Michigan Law School, 1950. Pp. xiv, 441.
Five lectures delivered by a distinguished legal scholar at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School in April, 1949, being the second of a series
established under the will of the late William W. Cook for the purpose of
stimulating legal research, form the basis of this book, although two of
the chapters are reprints of articles written years ago and originally
printed elsewhere.' It is characteristic of Professor Chafee, already re-
nowned for knowledge and scholarship in many fields of law, that he
should choose some seemingly unconnected problems of equity and, by
combining them into one lecture series, should demonstrate the distinc-
tiveness of equity as a system of its own while, at the same time, empha-
sizing the different approach which equity has toward the solution of
various problems. The resulting product constitutes an effective answer
to the now recognized ill-advised movement for the elimination of Equity
as a separate course in the law school curriculum. The little band of those
who still remain unconvinced should, by a reading of these lectures and
the author's casebooks on the subject, be able to eliminate all doubts and
join in the movement to restore Equity to the position it rightly deserves.
The book is divided into three parts, one dealing with the clean hands
doctrine, another with representative suits, and the third with lack of
power and mistaken use of power. Concerning the first, Professor Chafee
sets out to pull the doctrine down to earth from the level of the lofty
height of high-sounding phrases and cliches at which it has been placed
by over-enthusiastic yet ofttimes superficial lawyers. Debunking the doc-
trine and questioning its status as a maxim, he asserts it is not peculiar
to equity but more nearly consists of a bundle of rules relating to quite
diverse subjects, the application of which have, at times, done more harm
than good. 2 In support of the argument that the clean hands doctrine is
not a single equitable principle, the author discloses that an examination
of the applicable cases reveals the existence of not a single but actually
eighteen different classes of situations responding thereto, which eighteen
he discusses and analyzes separately. Particularly impressive, in this
' See Chafee, "Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts?" 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1
(1926), and Chafee, "Bills of Peace with Mulitple Parties," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1297
(1932).
2 Recent growth of the doctrine, often a bone of bitter contention, is illustrated by
Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U. S. 383, 64 S. Ct. 622, 88 L. Ed. 814
(1944), and other like cases.
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reviewer's opinion, is the treatment accorded to the classes which deal
with suits to enforce illegal contracts, suits to protect copyright and lit-
erary property rights, and cases involving matrimonal litigation.
A tremendous growth in the use of the procedural device of the
representative suit is noted in the part of the book devoted to that topic.
The enactment of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts,8 with its elaborate provision about class suits, and of the Fair
Labor Standards, which authorizes the filing of suits for unpaid minimum
wages or overtime compensation by one or more employees, or by a
designated agent, "for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated,"
4
has undoubtedly contributed to that result. The author, while tracing the
origin of the class suit to the earlier bill of peace with multiple parties,
nevertheless stresses the distinction between these two procedural devices.
Under a bill of peace, all interested parties unite as plaintiffs, although
seeking individual relief, because the investigation of the respective claims
would be, to a great extent, identical in the several cases. In the repre-
sentative suit, however, the plaintiff becomes the self-elected representative
of others who may have a common interest or a common grievance.
The ideal situation for a class suit will prevail, in the author's opinion,
if "the members of the group are lost in the crowd and do not present
individual claims or defenses which will require elaborate attention from
the court."5 The author emphasizes that the expression of the ideal situa-
tion does not mean that courts should never go outside the suggested limits;
more nearly, that if they do, they should proceed with caution.
Particular attention is paid, by Professor Chafee, to the question of
the binding effect of the class-suit decree upon the unnamed and unserved
represented parties. His discussion of a problem which is particularly
difficult in view of due process requirements is both searching and enlight-
ening. His demand that some sort of notice to them should be provided
is just and laudable. He rightly points out that one of the biggest and
most neglected of problems entailed in class suits is the formulation ol
machinery by which such persons may become informed. Formal service
being inappropriate, informal notice, for example an advertisement on
the financial page of a large newspaper, might satisfy.
3 28 U. S. C. A., Rule 23.
4 29 U. S. C. A. § 216(b).
5 Chafee, Some Problems of Equity, p. 220. The derivative suit by one, or a few,
shareholders of stock in a corporation on behalf of all shareholders is typical. The
object of such a suit is the redress of an injury inflicted on the corporation, as
distinct from one which might have been directly inflicted on the shareholders. The
right asserted is that of the corporation and any benefits obtained from the litiga-
tion inure to it. Aside from certain procedural requirements, one shareholder is
interchangeable with any other and internal differences between shareholders are
of no importance.
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The third and final part of the book, one dealing with lack of power
and mistaken use of power, might be entitled, as this reviewer would prefer
it, "general jurisdiction as distinguished from 'equity' jurisdiction."
While general jurisdiction deals with the question as to whether the
sovereign has entrusted the decision of a particular case to a particular
court, equity jurisdiction addresses itself to the problem as to whether or
not there is a proper basis for coming into equity at all or whether equitable
relief ought to be granted. Theoretically, the line of demarcation between
the two would seem rather clear and simple; in practice, however, grave
difficulties have arisen, sometimes due to an unfortunate confusion in
terminology while, on other occasions, produced by the confused thinking
on the part of a few judges. To deal with all aspects of the problem so
analyzed would unduly lengthen this review. Suffice it to say that the
author's discussion and criticisms are masterful.
F. HmEzoG
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES. George E. Osborne. St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1951. Pp. xxi, 1117.
For many years, those who desired to use or possess a textual treat-
ment of the law of mortgages of less elaborate character than such masterly
treatises as those produced by Glenn, Jones or Wiltsie were forced to rely
on the excellent but slender summary compiled by Walsh. There is now
available, in customary Hornbook format, the more extensive, almost
encyclopedic, analysis prepared by Professor Osborne. With a deprecating
modesty reaching to almost unworthy lengths, the author has deplored
the necessity for keeping the work to a reasonable compass. He should,
by contrast, have demanded praise for making the book so comprehensive
in so brief a space. No issue of law affecting the mortgage relationship, no
judicial or statutory trend, however modern, has been overlooked. What
lack there may be in failing to provide a digest of every recorded case in
a field well known to be filled to overflowing is more than offset by suitable
reference to leading and representative decisions and to collateral mate-
rials. More of interest, perhaps, is the fact that the work, while scholarly,
is not just another dry treatise. Pungent comments and criticisms of
existing doctrines as well as applause for well-turned views, scattered
throughout the book, bring relief to pages that might otherwise force the
mind to bog down under the sheer weight and intricacy of the material
discussed. The author should rest assured that, except for change in the
law itself, there will be no need for an "eventual second edition" in which
to correct errors and failings in the present one.
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INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS. Elvin R. Latty. New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951. Pp. vii, 646.
An attempt has been made to compress many of the basic concepts
of agency, corporation, and partnership law into the compass of a slim
volume in order that a course in business associations, for which this book
is evidently intended as a primer, might be treated as a springboard to
the more abstruse concepts inherent in any one of these three fields of
study. It is to be doubted, however, that the author has fully realized his
goal. Unquestionably, in preference to a total absence of training in any
one or more of these branches of law, a course predicated on a book such
as this would be beneficial. Experience would indicate, nevertheless, that
legal concepts are best comprehended when examined and developed sepa-
rately. Confusion in the mind of the average student seems to be the order
of the day whenever varying, although analogous, concepts are discussed
together. To be sure, no field of law is independent of any other, but to
begin study in the more complex areas of any branch of law on the assump-
tion that basic concepts have been absorbed and understood is a mistake.
Aside from criticism of the basic theory underlying the instant volume,
there is the further fact that much too much of the book is devoted to
textual material rather than to cases. For example, of the twenty-six pages
comprising the first chapter, only five are devoted to the four cases con-
sidered. A corresponding ratio may be observed in the other chapters.
A happier medium could have been attained. A diligent student, unable
because of scheduling difficulties to enroll in agency or partnership courses,
would likely find this book invaluable just prior to bar examination time.
It might also serve as a refresher course. It is, however, ill adapted for use
in a full course devoted to either agency, corporation, or partnership law.
ESTATE AND Gi'T TAXATION: Cases and Materials. Boris I. Bittker. New
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951. Pp. xviii, 494, and supplement.
In response to the demand that the law school curriculum be enriched
by the addition of newer topics in fields of recent development, consid-
erable effort has been put forth in recent years to. integrate older and
related materials into more compact courses to permit the release of time
for study in these newer fields. Separate courses in liens, pledges, mort-
gages and suretyship, for example, have been telescoped into a unit of
Security Transactions. Agency, partnership and private corporations
have been combined into a category of Business Organizations. Other
illustrations could come readily to mind. With the publication of Pro-
fessor Bittker's book, however, there may be some indication that the
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pendulum has swung too far in the direction of consolidation and is now due
to reverse itself in favor of a fragmented approach to the study of law.
Acting on the premise that courses in taxation have been weighted
heavily along the lines of income and similar taxes, with estate and gift
taxation receiving only a few pages or chapters in casebook collections, he
has broken off this small segment from the general field for more intensive
treatment.
It is doubtful if a law school dean will welcome the thought that a
crowded curriculum should be made even more crowded by the addition
of yet another course on a single aspect of taxation, but he will no longer
be able to utilize the excuse that suitable material is lacking for the
present book, with its eighty-page supplement of specimen returns com-
pletely worked out for filing, nullifies any such alibi. He may now seek
refuge in the claim that it would be ridiculous to spend perhaps from a
third to a half of the time generally devoted to teaching taxation in an
area which, as the author acknowledges, produces only from two to five per
cent. of the governmental revenues. The question, however, is not one
to be resolved in terms of percentages, for skill in long-range planning is
something each law student should develop. If both the dean and the
student would trouble themselves to read the author's introduction, each
might awaken to the fact that there is occasion to welcome a work of this
sort if for no more than as a valuable adjunct to other tax casebooks.
The lawyer, too, could learn that a collection of cases and materials on a
specialized subject such as this one may often fill a substantial gap in his
working library.
DESTINATION UNKNOWN: FIFTY YEARS OF LABOR RELATIONS. Walter Gor-
don Merritt. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951. Pp. x, 454.
The compilation of an unbiased and objective history of labor relations
in the United States over the past fifty years would be a worthwhile task
for it could contribute much to an understanding of present-day labor
conditions. It would serve its purpose, however, only if it were prepared by
one possessed of unbiased judgment. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the
author of this book, a lawyer who has battled organized labor throughout
his career, should disclose a lack as to these needed qualities; for his book
is nothing short of a constant and total accusation of unions and union
leaders as being the epitome of everything evil. Perhaps this jaundiced
attitude can be traced to the author's early experiences, for he describes
how he, the son of a union-battling hat manufacturer, grew up in Connecti-
cut, and how his first activity, as a lawyer fresh from law school, was to
fight the Hatters' Union in the celebrated Danbury Hatters' case. His
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early characterization of the agents of that union as being "bloodhounds"
may be symptomatic of his later attitude, albeit later pronouncements
are not quite so vigorous, being mollified by an apparent sense of diplomacy.
The author's method for the compilation of his historical treatment
of the subject is to take some well-known labor cases, chiefly those in
which he has actively participated, to describe them, and then to append
his own opinion concerning them. As these descriptions reflect a purely
one-sided approach, being written by a man who has been passionately
engaged on but one side of the industrial battle, it is not astonishing that
the author should arrive at a completely distorted as well as a gloomy
picture of American labor relations. Not that plenty of criticism cannot
be levelled against unions in general, or against certain labor leaders in
particular, for there is much to criticize. Valid criticism, however, would
fall a long way short of the intimation that almost everything about
unionism is bad. So negative an attitude most certainly would contribute
nothing to industrial peace, particularly since it would neglect completely,
as does the author, to take into consideration those causes which have
provoked the development and growth of unionism in this country. Yet,
without such consideration, it is difficult to fathom how fifty years of labor
relations can be accurately appraised. From such scant preparation, a trip
into the future must, of necessity, lead to a "destination unknown." As a
consequence, many of the suggestions made by the author must be viewed
with caution, although some of them would seem reasonable and just.
One chapter, entitled "The Onward March of Collective Bargaining,"
should be excepted from the scope of this criticism for the author there
basis his observations and conclusions upon his great experience in the field
and on an obvious attempt to be impartial. It is probably the best part
of the book.
For an antidote, this reviewer would suggest a re-reading of the
objective description of labor relations in this country, with its sound
criticism of the bad things in unionism, to be found in Professor Gregory's
"Labor and the Law."' Of like character is the article entitled "Labor,
Legislation, and the Role of Government," written by Professors Fein-
singer and Witte.2 The positive approach to the problem and the optimism
to be there encountered should prove refreshing after the sordid picture
painted in the book under review.
F. HERzoG
1 Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.,
1949), Rev. Ed.
2 Feinsinger and Witte, "Labor, Legislation, and the Role of Government," 71
Monthly Labor Rev. 48 (1950).
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CORPORATE MEETINGS, MINUTES, AND RESOLUTIONS, Third Edition. Lillian
Doris and Edith J. Friedman. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.
Pp. lxxiii, 1114.
Ten years of experience under laws of the type of the Securities
Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Trust In-
denture Act, and the revision of the Bankruptcy Act should offer proof
enough of the necessity for revising form books intended to aid corporate
officials and their lawyers. Awareness of this fact has led the authors of
this corporate secretary's vade mecum to revise, up-date and release the
third edition. A rapid glance at the cases cited in support of the textual
material which precedes the specimen forms makes evident the inclusion
of scores of new cases decided within the last decade.1 The forms them-
selves have likewise been subjected to much revision.
Perhaps more important than the timeliness of the book is the thor-
oughness with which the job has been done. Details have been worked out
to the length where, for example, check lists have been provided concern-
ing things to watch for or persons to notify in case a change occurs in
so simple a matter as the corporate name. The corporate secretary is even
warned, in relation to his duties, to have the correct amount of cash on
hand, in proper denominations, to pay the directors for their services if
prompt payment at the close of each meeting has been the practice in the
past! The evident desire for efficient operation, as indicated by such
advice, has been carried over to make this third edition of a popular
work into a most usable publication. It provides the answers not only
for the obvious but also for those abstruse2 questions which may arise in
the matter of preparing corporate minutes or supervising the conduct of
corporate meetings.
1 It is not claimed that the list is complete. In the discussion of the right of a
corporation to amend the articles, so as to deprive preferred shareholders of accrued
but undeclared cumulative dividends, no mention is made of the holding in The
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N. E. (2d) 722 (1949), noted in
27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REViEw 159, which produced a marked change in the Illinois
law on the point. The presence of other recent Illinois cases is, however, noted.
2 What, for example, should the chairman do if persons not entitled to vote have
been admitted to a stockholders' meeting and their continued presence might lead to
potential objections or antagonisms? An ingenious and diplomatic answer is pro-
vided by the authors at page 15. Or try this one: Between a regular meeting and
an adjourned session thereof, a registered shareholder has transferred his shares
but still desires to vote the same on the theory he was a holder at the time the
meeting commenced. Is he entitled to do so? A documented answer is given at
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tort liability would lie, may be
used to mitigate damage in suit
against another whose tort lia-
bility arises from the same cir-
cumstance 360-1
Nature and grounds in general:
Whether corporate director may
secure reimbursement from his
corporation for his attorney's
fees when he has been successful
in the defense of a stockholder's
derivative action 344-8
DEATH
See also Automobiles, Conflict of
Laws, Joint Tenancy
Actions for causing death: Whether
or not an artificially created
water-filled excavation consti-
tutes an attractive nuisance for
purpose of determining liability
for death of trespassing infant
172-6
Contempt of court: Whether or not
the refusal of witness before
grand jury to answer several
questions concerning the same
subject matter warrants punish-
ment as for several contempts of
court 348-51
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
See also Charities, Mortgages
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 64-8
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
See also Government, Jury
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 6878
Nature and elements of crime and
defenses in general: Whether
1951 amendment to Uniform Nar-
cotic Drug Act is constitutional
(Illinois) 315-21
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 43
Proceedings: Whether or not time
for appeal in a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding is to be meas-
ured by applicable legal or equi-
table rule 278-9
DEEDS
See also Easements, Future Inter-
ests, Mortgages, Property, Ven-
dor and Purchaser
Requisites and validity: Whether or
not minor, unable to return bene-
fits received, ratifies his deed by
failure to take affirmative action
to repudiate within seven months
after attaining majority 361-3
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
See also Executors and Adminis-
trators, Wills and Administra-
tion
Persons entitled and their respective
shares: Whether a surviving
joint tenant who has slain the
co-tenant obtains clear title to
the jointly owned property by




Rights and liabilities of heirs and
distributees: Whether or not,
where intestacy has been found
to exist, a bona fide purchaser of
property from an heir is pro-
tected against claims by devisee
named in a subsequently pro-
bated will 265-9
DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 48-9
EASEMENTS
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 91-2
EMINENT DOMAIN
Nature, extent, and delegation of
power: Whether statute author-
izing municipality to acquire
-land for purpose of providing
off-street parking facilities is
constitutional 188-9
EQUITY
See also Appeal and Error, Chari-
ties, Divorce, Injunction, Prac-
tice and Pleading, Trusts
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 37-43
Bibliography: Chafee: Some Prob-
lems of Equity 364-6
EVIDENCE
See also Charities, Courts, Crimi-
nal 'Law and Procedure, Dam-
ages
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 49-50
FAMILY
See alsQ Adoption, Divorce, Hus-
band and Wife, Infants, Mar-
riage
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 78-83
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
See also Landlord and Tenant
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 37
DIVORCE
See also Family, Infants
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 78-81
Alimony, allowances, and disposition
of property: Whether or not re-
troactive effect should be given
to the statutory amendment de-
signed to preserve lump-sum set-
tlements from the consequence
of remarriage (Illinois) 279-80
EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS
See also Automobiles, Descent and
Distribution, Future Interests,
Gift, Insurance, Wills and Ad-
ministration
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 101-4
Allowance and payment of claims:
Methods for the valuation of
property for estate, gift, and in-
come tax purpbses 321-8
Allowances to surviving wife, hus-
band, or child: Whether or not
a widow is entitled to a full
award when she dies prior to
the expiration of the statutory
support period and before the
award has been granted 270-6
Collection and management of es-
tate: Whether it is proper to
deduct a pro-rata share of all
debts and expenses from the
value of local property in com-
puting the inheritance tax pay-
able by a non-resident decedent's
estate 283-4
Distribution of estate: Whether or
not a legatee granted an annuity
by will may elect to take the
capital sum in lieu thereof 176-80
Tenant's fixtures: Whether or not a
right of removal of fixtures con-
ferred by lease is lost by reason
of forfeiture of the leasehold in
forcible entry and detainer pro-
ceedings 185-7
FUTURE INTERESTS
See also Executors and Adminis-
trators, Joint Tenancy, Taxation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 84-6
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
GIFT
Delivery: Whether provisions of Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act make
delivery non-essential to a valid
gift of share of corporate stock
340-3
GOVERNMENT
See also Commerce, Constitutional
Law, Courts, Eminent Domain,
Housing, Municipal Corpora-
tions, Public Utilities, Subroga-
tion, Taxation, Zoning
Bibliography: Water Resources Poli-
cy Commission: Water Resources
Law, Vol. III 292-3
Regulation of water supply: Whether
government should act to regu-
late artificial inducement of rain-
fall 150-7
HOUSING
See also Forcible Entry and De-
tainer, Landlord and Tenant
Public regulation: Whether segrega-
tion ordinances which prohibit
persons of different races or
color from living in the same lo-
cality are constitutional 329-33
HUSBAND AND WIFE
See also Adoption, Divorce, Mar-
riage
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 78-83
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
See also Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Jury, Trial Procedure
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 71-3
INFANTS
See also Adoption, Damages, Fam-
ily, Negligence
Actions: Whether or not minor, un-
able to return benefits received,
ratifies his deed by failure to
take affirmative action to repu-
diate within seven months after
attaining majority 361-3
Taxation: Income taxation as a po-
tential destroyer of crime
197-227
Federal taxation of illegal Income:
200-16
a. Constitutional and statutory
provisions 2004
b. Judicial interpretation of tax
statutes 204-10
c. Necessity for uniformity in
taxation 211-16
Tax administration and enforce-
ment: 216-27
a. Present views on administra-
tion 216-7
b. Allowability of deductions
217-21
c. Sufficiency of present penal-
ties 221-2
d. Privilege against disclosure
222-5
e. Establishing the fact of viola-
tion 225-7
Actions: Whether, in view of enact-
ment of Married Women's Acts,
a wife may maintain an action
for loss of consortium based on
negligent injury caused to her
husband 162-7
Mutual rights, duties, and liabilities:
Whether or not surviving spouse
is entitled to a full award when
such survivor dies prior to the
expiration of the statutory sup-
port period and before the award
has been granted 270-6
Bibliography: Teeters and Reine-
mann: The Challenge of Delin-
quency 105-6
INJUNCTION
See also Appeal and Error, Equity
Nature and grounds in general:
Whether injunction proceeding
may be used to test validity of
annexation proceeding by which
one municipality takes over gov-





See also Charities, Damages
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 18-25
Bibliography: Bowe: Life Insurance
and Estate Tax Planning 286-7
JOINT TENANCY
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 92
Survivorship: Whether a surviving
joint tenant who has slain the
cotenant obtains clear title to the
jointly owned property by virtue
of the right of survivorship
260-5
JUDGMENT
See also Appeal and Error, Declar-
atory Judgment, Trial Procedure
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 64-8
On consent, offer, or admission:
Whether order dismissing suit,
entered at request of plaintiff
after motion to strike his com-
plaint has been sustained, is an
appealable order at instance of
the plaintiff 357-8
JURISPRUDENCE
Bibliography: Chafee: Some Prob-
lems of Equity 364-6
LABOR LAW
See also Commerce, Master and
Servant, Unemployment Compen-
sation, Workmen's Compensation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 10-3
Bibliography: Merritt: Destination
Unknown: Fifty Years of Labor
Relations 368-9
Werne: The Law of Labor Rela-
tions 287-91
Yoder: Prentice-Hall Labor Course,
1951 Ed. 106
The relation of master and servant:
Office buildings and the NLRB
247-54
INTOXICATING LIQUORS
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 146-7
Civil damage laws: Whether or not
the Dram Shop Act allows a re-
covery for injuries arising out
of an accident occurring in a
sister state 187-8
Cook: Legal Drafting 293-4
Merritt: Destination Unknown:
Fifty Years of Labor Relations
368-9
Rabel: The Conflict of Laws; A
Comparative Study, Vol. III
291-2
Teeters and Reinemann: The
Challenge of Delinquency 105-6
JURY
See also Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Damages, Evidence, Trial
Procedure
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 47-8
Attendance and examination of wit-
nesses: Whether or not the re-
fusal of witness before grand
jury to answer several questions
concerning the same subject mat-
ter warrants punishment as for
several contempts 348-51
LANDLORD AND TENANT
See also Constitutional Law, Forci-
ble Entry and Detainer, Hous-
ing, Intoxicating Liquors, Oil
and Gas
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 94
Fixtures: Whether or not a right of
removal of fixtures conferred by
lease is lost by reason of for-
feiture of the leasehold 185-7
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
See aso Conflict of Laws, Corpora-
tions, Municipal Corporations
In general: Survey of Illinois law




Remarriage: Whether or not retro-
active effect should be given to
the statutory amendment de-
signed to preserve lump-sum ali-
mony settlement from the con-
sequence of remarriage 279-80
MASTER AND SERVANT
See also Charities, Corporations,
Partnership, Patent Law, Unem-
ployment Compensation, Work-
men's Compensation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 6-10
Bibliography: Latty: Introduction
to Business Associations 367
Verne: The Law of Labor Re-
lations 287-91
Services and compensation: Whether
or not an employee is entitled
to unemployment compensation
benefits for the period when the
plant is closed for vacation
168-72
The relation: Whether or not oper-
ator of office and similar build-
ings is engaged in interstate com-
merce so as to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board 247-54
MORTGAGES
See also Deeds, Taxation,, Vendor
and Purchaser
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 94-8
NAMES
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 17
Assumed names: Whether or not
contract made by one who has
failed to comply with statute
regulating use of an assumed
name is valid and enforcible
282
NEGLIGENCE
See also Automobiles, Bailnwnt,
Charities, Damages, Husband
and Wife, Intoxicating Liquors,
Limitation, of Actions, Municipal
Corporations, Torts
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 147-8
Acts or omissions constituting negli-
gence: Whether or not an artifi-
Bibliography: Osborne: Handbook
on the Law of Mortgages 366
Payment or performance of condi-
tion: Whether an agreement de-
signed to extinguish mortgage
debt upon the death of the mort-
gagee is to be regarded as a
testamentary disposition requir-
ing attention to the formalities
of a will 194-5
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
See also Brokers, Commerce, Hous-
ing, Zoning
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 144-6
Creation, alteration, existence and
dissolution: Whether the failure
to include the terms of annexa-
tion in the initiating ordinance
voids the arrangement even
though the voters approve the
action 281-2
Property: Whether statute authoriz-
ing a municipality to acquire
land for purpose of providing
off-street parking facilities is
constitutional 188-9
Torts: Necessity for notice within
statutory period as condition pre-
cedent to suit for failure to sup-
press rioting 43-4
Whether police officer of municipal
corporation is immune from lia-
bility for his negligence when
operating a motor vehicle in per-
formance of his duties 189-90
cially created water-filled exca-
vation constitutes an attractive
nuisance 172-6
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
See also Security Transactions
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 25-7
Requisites and validity: Whether
personal defenses are available
against an accommodation en-
dorser who has been obliged to
pay the holder of a check follow-
ing dishonor thereof by the
drawer 184-5
Rights and liabilities on endorsement
and transfer: Whether or not
endorsement of a negotiable in-
strument by an imposter payee
serves to pass title to a holder
in due course 158-62
INDEX-DIGEST
OIL AND GAS
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 83-4
PARTIES
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 46-7
PARTNERSHIP
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 14-7
Bibliography: Latty: Introduction to
Business Associations 367
PATENT LAW
Assignment of patents: Right of em-
ployer to assignment of patents
obtained by employee on dis-
coveries made during course of
employment 7-9
PRACTICE AND PLEADING
See also Actions, Adoption, Appeal
and Error, Attorney and Client,
Charities, Courts, Dam-ages,
Equity, Evidence, Forcible En-
try and Detainer, Injunction,
Judgment, Limitation of Actions,
Parties, Process, Trial Pro-
cedure, Venue
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 29-68
Appearance: Whether or not a gen-
eral appearance may be with-
drawn, and a special appearance
be entered, after delay granted
at defendant's request 358-9
Costs: Whether costs incurred in
order to overcome defenses not
made in good faith may be taxed
at an ex parte hearing (Illinois
practice) 277
Plea or answer: Whether or not an
objection to venue may be raised
by a denial type of answer 191-2
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
See also Attorney and Client,
Brokers, Charities, Labor Law,
Master and Servant, Workmen's
Compensation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 6-10
PROCESS
See Practice and Pleading
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 30-3
Service: Whether statutory amend-
ment authorizing substituted
service of process on resident




See also Bailment, Commerce,
Deeds, Descent and Distribution,
Easements, Gift, Joint Tenancy,
Landlord and Tenant, Mort-
gages, Patent Law, Taxation,
Titles, Trusts, Vendor and Pur-
chaser, Zoning
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 83-104
Bibliography: Water Resources Poli-
cy Commission: Water Re-
sources Law, Vol. III 292-3
Valuation: Methods for the valua-
tion of property for estate, gift,
and income tax purposes 321-8
Water and water courses: Whether
artificial rain-maker has right to
appropriate water suspended in
form of clouds by inducing rain-
fall 150-7
PUBLIC UTILITIES
See also Administrative Law
Companies, persons, and instrumen-
talities subject to jurisdiction:
Parking Facilities as Public
Utilities 295-314
Commercial parking under public
regulation 311-3
Legal elements of a public utility:
296-311
a. Affected with a public interest
298-300




d. Association with transporta-
tion and distribution 305-6
e. Certificates of convenience
and necessity 306-7
f. Rate regulation 308-11
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
P (Cont'd)
Regulation of business in general:
Warehouse regulation since




See also Brokers, Deeds, Descent
and Distribution, Eminent Do-
main, Future Interests, Housing,
Joint Tenancy, Landlord and
Tenant, Mortgages, Oil and Gas,
Taxation, Trusts, Vendor and
Purchaser, Zoning
SALES
See also Creditor's Rights, Names
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 27-9
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
See also Mortgages, Negotiable In-
struments
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 94-8
Bibliography: Osborne: Handbook
on the Law of Mortgages 866
STOCKHOLDERS
See Corporations
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 2-5
TAXATION
Bibliography: Bittker: Estate and
Gift Taxation; Cases and Ma-
terials 867-8
Bowe: Life Insurance and Estate
Tax Planning 286-7
Estate and gift taxes: Methods for
the valuation of property for
estate, gift, and income tax pur-
poses 321-8
Income taxation: Potential destroyer
of crime 197-227
Federal taxation of illegal income:
200-16
a. Constitutional and statutory
provisions 2004
b. Judicial interpretation of tax
statutes 204-10
c. Necessity for uniformity in
taxation 211-16
Extent of federal regulation 124-31
Interstate character of warehous-
ing operations 122-3
State regulation following Munn v.
Illinois 123-4
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 83-92
REPLEVIN
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 36-7
SUBROGATION
Persons liable for loss or injury:
Whether employer whose insur-
ance carrier has paid compensa-
tion claim under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act may be re-
quired to make contribution to
or indemnify a third person
352-6
Waiver or loss of right to subroga-
tion: Whether state relinquishes
right of subrogation by offsetting
workmen's compensation pay-
ments against state retirement
system benefits 284-5
Tax administration and enforce-
ment: 216-7
a. Present views on administra-
tion 216-7
b. Allowability of deductions
217-21
c. Sufficiency of present penal-
ties 221-2
d. Privilege against disclosure
222-5
e. Establishing the fact of viola-
tion 225-7
Legacy, inheritance and transfer
taxes: Whether it is proper to
deduct a pro-rata share of all
debts and expenses from the
value of local property in com-
puting the inheritance tax pay-





See also Deeds, Descent and Dis-
tribution, Joint Tenancy, Real
Property
Slander of title: Adequacy of com-
plaint in suit for slander of title
to personal property 148-9
TORTS





In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 147-9
Nuisance: Whether artificial rain-
making amounts to the commis-
sion of a nuisance 150-7
TRADE REGULATION
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 146-7
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
See Master and Servant
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 10-2
Services and compensation: Whether
compulsory disclosure under oath
of political beliefs and affilia-
tions is a valid prerequisite to
the payment of unemployment
compensation 255-60
Whether or not an employee is
entitled to unemployment com-
pensation benefits for the period
when the plant is closed for
vacation 168-72
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
See also Creditors' Rights, Deeds
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 86-91
Rights and liabilities of parties:
Whether or not, where intestacy
has been found to exist, a bona
fide purchaser of property from
an heir is protected against
claims by devisee named in a
subsequently probated will 265-9
TRIAL PROCEDURE
See also Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Equity, Evidence, Jury,
Practice and Pleading
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 47-53
TRUSTS
See also Charities, Creditors'
Rights, Wills and Administra-
tion
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 98-101
Constructive trusts: Whether agent,
under oral agreement to pur-
chase land on behalf of prin-
cipal, may be declared construc-
tive trustee over purchase made
in own name 9-10
UNIFORM LAWS
Narcotic Drug Act: Whether 1951
amendment to Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act is constitutional (Illi-
nois) 315-21
Negotiable Instruments Act: Wheth-
er personal defenses are avail-able against an accommodation
endorser who has been obliged to
pay the holder of a check fol-
lowing dishonor thereof by the
drawer 184-5
Stock Transfer Act: Whether pro-
visions of Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act make delivery non-essen-
tial to a valid gift of share of
corporate stock 340-3
VENUE
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950
47-8 and 73-4
Nature or subject of action: Wheth-
er or not an objection to venue




See also Descent and Distribution,
Executors and Administrators,
Joint Tenancy
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 101-4
Construction: Whether or not a leg-
atee granted an annuity by will
may elect to take the capital
sum in lieu thereof 176-80
Whether or not bequest of money
on deposit includes money con-
tained in testator's safety de-
posit box located in vault of a
banking institution 192-3
Requisites and validity: W hetber an
agreement designed to extin-
guish a mortgage debt on the
death of the mortgagee is to be
regarded as a testamentary dis-
position requiring attention to
the formalities of a will 194-5
ZONING
Discrimination: Whether ordinances
which prohibit persons of differ-
ent races or color from living in
the same locality are constitu-
tional 329-33
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
See also Conflict of Laws, Master
and Servant
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1949-1950 13-4
Actions by third persons against em-
ployer: Whether employer whose
insurance carrier has paid com-
pensation under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act may be re-
quired to make contribution to or
indemnify a third party 352-6
Effect of act on other statutory or
common law rights of action and
defenses: Whether state relin-
quishes right of subrogation by
offsetting workmem's compensa-
tion payments against state re-
tirement system benefits 284-5
